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Private property is the most important guarantee of freedom.
Friedrich A. Hayek
Nobody spends somebody else's money as carefully as he spends his own.
Nobody uses somebody else's resources as carefully as he uses his own.
So if you want efficiency and effectiveness, if you want knowledge to be properly utilized,
you have to do it through the means of private property.
Milton Friedman
And what we have to do is make sure that [capitalism] works for the majority,
which it does not.What we see in the West, which is the reason why it works,
is that capitalism is essentially all about property rights,
rights that can be transacted in a market to further the distribution of work,
the division of labor. And what occurs in at least 80% to 85% of a population 
of the third world and former communist nations is that 
part of the population has assets. They do have assets, as a matter of fact,
trillions of dollars, but they're not paper rights in a property rights system,
so their value cannot travel and actually insert itself into a diversified market.
Hernando de Soto
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Iwas most honored when the Property Rights Alliance (PRA) announced in2006 the creation of the Hernando de Soto Fellowship, a research fund
with the core aim of producing the International Property Rights Index (IPRI),
the most comprehensive effort at creating a nuanced gauge of the status of
private property rights throughout the world. The first de Soto Fellow
prepared the maiden edition of the International Property Rights Index (IPRI)
for 2007, comparing property rights protection for 70 countries. I am pleased
to introduce the 2008 index, covering 115 countries, and I take this
opportunity to congratulate the second de Soto Fellow, Satya Thallam, for his
work developing and researching this project.
You are now reading the only available annual international index dedicated exclusively to property right
issues – and the only to integrate both the intellectual and physical aspects of property. In order to provide
a more nuanced picture of property rights regimes throughout the world, this year’s IPRI includes cases
studies from South Africa and Argentina, showing that extending property rights to the poor gives them
the incentive to invest in and maintain their property; the Argentinean case has already achieved a certain
amount of fame in the literature. In future editions, policymakers, academics, business leaders, think tanks,
and other specialists will be analyzing and discussing developments in the property rights regimes of
specific selected countries. 
This year’s IPRI provides further proof of the relationship between the robustness of a country’s property
rights system and its economic development, revealing that much still needs to be done to extend
property rights to more people, especially the poor. The average property rights index of the 115
economies sampled is down from the previous year, and even in the countries that score best for
protecting property rights, there is room for improvement. Missing, for example, in most of the countries
examined are the legal tools essential for giving every citizen, not just the wealthy and well-connected,
easy access to the market and thus pull themselves out of poverty: inclusive property systems to hold and
leverage their assets, legal forms to organize their businesses, and devices to identify themselves and
operate in expanded markets.
Warmest regards, 
Hernando de Soto
President of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy
(ILD)
Lima, Peru
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The Property Rights Alliance (PRA), along with our global partners, is proud to bring to you thesecond edition of the International Property Rights Index (IPRI). The inaugural 2007 IPRI sought
to lay the groundwork for establishing the first international comparative study that measures the
significance of both physical and intellectual property rights and their protection for a countries economic
well-being. With the 2008 IPRI, we have been able to greatly expand the scope of variables measured as
well as the countries studied. 
With regard to private property rights, PRA has and continues to subscribe to the notion that the
protection of both physical and intellectual property is equally important in nature. Property rights
contribute to increased levels of stability and provide people with the knowledge and comfort that their
property will remain theirs. Patents and copyrights provide inventors and great thinkers with the ability
to be rightly rewarded for their innovations. Likewise, land rights provide empowerment through
ownership, allowing citizens to utilize and prosper from their investment. 
By that same token, the ability for states to create and maintain the necessary institutions that work to
uphold these protections is equally essential. A system that allows for the free exchange of goods and
ideas, without the threat of expropriation, increases the level of confidence that encourages economic
development through trade and investment.  
As property rights continue to face challenges around the world, we hope this study will be a useful tool
for policymakers, think tanks, academics, and investors by highlighting the importance of property rights
as a key building block for economic growth.    
We would like to thank all of the partners and contributors for their effort in helping with the
development of the 2008 IPRI. I would also like to thank the author of this year’s index, Satya Thallam,
for his time and dedication to creating a remarkable tool that property rights advocates around the world
can use for years to come.  
Finally, a special thank you to Hernando de Soto for lending his name and support to the Hernando de
Soto Fellowship program. His commitment and passion to the area of property rights helped make our
work possible.
Best regards,
Kelsey Zahourek
Executive Director of the Property Rights Alliance
Washington, DC
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FOREWARD BY RICHARD A. EPSTEIN
The Role of Property Rights and Voluntary Exchange 
for Economic Development
One of the great challenges to any society is to develop a strong system of private property rights
that will allow for economic growth and development. The obstacles that stand in the path of this
enterprise are considerable and need close attention. The initial puzzle is conceptual in nature.
Property rights are defined as those rights that one individual possesses over a thing to the
exclusion of everyone else in the world. 
The first question is, how do we come to create any property rights, and on this point there is a
genuine puzzle. If property rights must be good against the world, why are they created simply by
allowing one person to have the exclusive right to his labor or the exclusive right to things that are
taken out of the state of nature? The answer cannot be by universal consent, for there are always
individuals who would refuse to give their consent if they could not capture the lion’s share of gain
from the activities of others.
It is for this reason that we need to develop a strong utilitarian foundation for property rights which
explains why their social recognition and protection works to the long-term advantage to us all.
Two reasons quickly go to the head of the list: The need for long term investments and the need to
facilitate voluntary cooperation.
Productive human engagement requires the addition of human resources to natural ones. But who
will decide to add his or her labor to any natural resource if the products that result must be shared
with other individuals who did not participate in their creation? The iron law of human self-interest
has strong exceptions for family and friends, but we can confidently predict that few people will
make this effort, because they would instead prefer to free ride off the efforts of others. Without a
system of property rights, therefore, human productive activity will be limited. Persons will only
create what they can immediately consume, which means that they will not make extensive
investments today because of their inability to reap their gains tomorrow. The creation of a
workable system of property rights allows human labor to take the long view. It is just for that
reason that, historically, rights in land only developed after agriculture became technically feasible.
The painful cost of clearing land and planting crops would never be undertaken by individuals who
had no expectation to gather the harvest. The “keep off” sign underwritten by society stops external
aggression, and provides the first missing element for social and economic advancement.
A system of property rights has a second advantage that is equal to that of the first.Once one
person has the exclusive right to control a particular resource, cooperation across individuals
becomes possible through voluntary exchange that works to the benefit of all parties. The rights of
property start with exclusion, but they also embrace the ability to use and dispose of property. It is
the use right that makes property valuable. And the exchange right allows for two important types
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of activities. The first is the exchange of commodities, first through barter and then through sale,
which allows for the specialization of labor. No individual has to be a jack-of-all-trades – each
person can become the master of one. The second is that the creation of property rights permits for
the organization of long term relationships such as partnerships and firms. Two people are often
able to cut down trees and build structures that no person could build alone. Joint labor can be
synergistic even without specialization.But specialization makes a huge difference for it allows two
or more people to combine their labor and their capital in innovative ways that increase the variety
and value of the products that they make available to outsiders through the medium of voluntary
exchange. 
This simple pattern of development works equally well in primitive and modern societies. First we
allow individuals to have exclusive domains against the rest of the world, and then we allow them to
exchange and cooperate with those individuals in whom they place their trust. It is sometimes said
that this system of property rights works only in certain limited conditions, so that the model does
not work in modern societies with huge populations and high levels of technical sophistication. But
this objection against the classical theory of property rights confuses matters greatly. To be sure, the
forms of productive activity will vary enormously with time and technology. But in most instances,
the differences in the forms of production will be reflected in the type of the agreements that
people make for the production and dissemination of goods within the traditional framework of
property and contract rights. Only in limited circumstances is it necessary to modify the underlying
rights structure so as to take into account the possibility of creating property rights in airspace and
the broadcast spectrum to allow for the useful exploitation of technologies that have no historical
antecedents. But in most cases the usual forms of voluntary interaction from secure property rights
will do the job. 
There are of course variations in how these rights are protected and exchanged across cultures. 
But this too does nothing to undermine the profound economic logic of a property rights system. 
As early as Roman times, commentators recognized that the formalities by which property was
acquired or transformed could differ across cultures. But these variations in how deeds are recorded
or contracts are witnessed only show the widespread utility of the underlying rights across time and
place, for otherwise why would so many societies create so many means to implement these central
features of social progress?
The study of comparative social institutions will reveal the power of these truths. Quite simply, only
those societies that develop rules of exclusion and cooperation will succeed. The paths taken to
reach this objective may vary, but the objective must always be there. 
To be sure, the creation of rights of property and contract are far from the only tasks that a
successful society must undertake. Public regimes for the enforcement of these rights must be
developed through open and transparent processes of law enforcement. And social expenditures are
needed for development of the highways and other infrastructure that link together separate
productive units within society. But at no point should we lose sight of the universality of the basic
truth of human nature, which rests on the twin functions of private property. Exclusive property
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rights prevent aggression and expropriation while facilitating productive voluntary exchange. The
success of any society, ancient or modern, depends critically on its ability to internalize and act on
this central truth. 
The country that exhibits a fidelity to respecting and vigilantly guarding the institutions of private
property are also those that benefit from higher levels of average wealth. The variables employed in
this index exhibit the many facets of these institutions, and how difficult it can be to institute an
ideal property rights regime. Indeed, as the case studies in this volume will show, upon closer
inspection, the problem of securing these rights becomes further entangled in the complexities of
local customs and constraints. Nevertheless, this report will hopefully inform the reader of the
importance of this policy pursuit and its necessity for any society hoping to become better off in
the future.
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INTRODUCTION 
“Property rights are human rights.”
—Armen Alchian 
“Private property is the most important guarantee of freedom.” 
—Friedrich A. Hayek
The importance of property is difficult to overstate. The basic unit of economics is the individual,
and one of the basic mediums of economic activity is exchange between individuals. Within the
nexus that occurs between exchanging individuals is a presumption of an institution which
delineates who owns what with regard to the exchanged goods and services, in other words a
property right. But for many years the existence of such an institution remained overlooked or at
best ignored by economists attempting to understand economic behavior.
So tacit remained the understanding of property rights in economics that it wasn’t largely until the
New Institutional Economics revolution (led by Harold Demsetz, Douglass North and others)
shined a bright light onto them that social scientists began to take notice. As Demsetz put it in
1966, “The role of property rights is not explicitly dealt with in [neoclassical economics].”1 He goes
on to write, “there must be assumed a set of social arrangements which define ownership.”
But the growing interest in institutions such as property rights also brought with it the predictable
complications of a closer inspection. Property rights, or as most people think of it “ownership,” is
not a binary concept wherein a person either owns something or not. In fact it may not refer to a
single person at all, but rather may involve collective ownership of something. And what does it
mean to “own” something (alternatively to have a property right in something)? At its most basic,
we can think of a property right as the ability to exclude others. 
But how far does that exclusion go? 
Say I own a house. In practice, most people would agree that ownership allows me to keep people
from coming inside – that is, my property right gives me the right to exclude others from also using
my house. But does it include keeping people off my front lawn? What if the neighbor’s Frisbee ends
up in my yard? To whom does it belong? Can I keep people from looking at my house and yard?
Can my neighbor erect a basketball hoop which casts a shadow onto my lawn? Should a jumbo jet
be allowed to fly overhead?
These kinds of questions motivate a deep literature in legal academia that helps us define the
institution of property rights on a micro level, as thorny and difficult to understand a concept as
exists in social science. Indeed, “the definition, allocation, and protection of property rights is one
of the most complex and difficult set of issues that any society has to resolve, but it is one that must
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be resolved in some fashion.”2 On this point, property rights, as concern policymakers and those
interested in economic development, have less to do with “who owns what?” and more to do with
the local norms, customs, conventions, and laws that determine ownership. 
This report, however, is motivated by a macro understanding of property rights across countries.
That is, we understand certain universal characteristics of property rights to be necessary for the
proper (read: efficient) ordering of economic activity and the higher standards of living that follow.
With that in mind, it necessary for the reader to understand the limitations of such a study to
account for the innumerable variations on the theme of property rights. Using data that is both
available and credible, the minutiae of ownership must be somewhat overlooked in favor of broad
and definable measures. The decision to use the measures employed in this study was the result of
extensive consultation with academics, policymakers, and practitioners who are familiar with
property rights on both purely theoretical and practical grounds. 
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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Clearly delineated property rights help lead to an efficient ordering of economic activity through
several channels: creating security beyond the short-term which incentivizes investment over long-
term horizons (dynamic efficiency); as a coordination device3; creating an element of clarity in
ownership which facilitates trade; as a first condition to an efficient allocation of resources4; as a
precondition for first-stage investment by outsiders.5
In the study of economic development, property rights have recently taken their proper place as a
necessary condition for a working market economy and efficient allocation of resources. 
In the United States, the latest iteration of foreign development aid, manifest in the several billion
dollars a year budget for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, places property rights as a crucial
development target for many of its donor countries. Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto’s work
on the empowering effect of giving land titles to the world’s poor has become de rigueur reading for
heads of states and policy practitioners alike. The United Nation’s Commission on Legal
Empowerment of the Poor has an entire working group, staffed by eminent scholars, focused
exclusively on property rights.
As report contributor Karol Boudreaux has written elsewhere, “After years of overlooking the central
role that property rights play in economic development and growth, scholars and policy makers are
beginning to recognize that property is a key building block of a prosperous society and must be
part of any sustainable development program.” But she goes on to reveal the difficulty in enacting
property rights-enhancing policies in such a way that they will be most effective and lead to
desirable outcomes.6
While forgoing much of the “ground level” technical detail necessary to implement specific reforms,
the results of this report highlight the broader relationship between property rights and prosperity.
The difference in income between the world’s poorest and richest countries exceeds a factor of 100,
and the authors of this report feel differences in the establishment and protection of property rights
can explain a great deal of this disparity. Indeed, the countries in the top quintile of the general
IPRI score have a GDP per capita that is more than nine times their counterparts in the lowest
quintile, an empirical reality that underlies the theoretical relationship between property rights and
economic growth found in the economic development literature.
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PREMISE FOR THE HERNANDO DE SOTO 
FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM
Property Rights Alliance (PRA) and the Hernando de Soto Fellowship
The premise and development of an international index of property rights (PR) is due to the efforts
of the Washington, DC-based Property Rights Alliance (PRA), dedicated to the protection of
property rights (physical and intellectual) in the U.S. and around the world. PRA is an affiliate of
the taxpayer advocacy organization, Americans for Tax Reform (ATR).
Despite the growing accessibility of international data and research in the property rights arena,
existing indices and studies traditionally focus on either the physical or intellectual aspects of
property rights. Additionally, most global indices are dedicated to broader topic areas than a more
exclusive and nuanced debate on property rights, although it should be noted that indices such as
the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index of Economic Freedom and the Fraser Institute Economic
Freedom of the World do address property rights although in the context of assembling a larger
snapshot of each country. To overcome the consequent lack of a more broadly defined PR gauge,
PRA introduced the Hernando de Soto Fellowship in 2006, with the core aim of the annually offered
fellowship to provide continuous data development and concept improvement for the annual
publication of the International Property Rights Index, presented here in its second edition.7
International Property Rights Index
With the inaugural publication of the International Property Rights Index (IPRI) in 2007, PRA
accounted for the interest of a variety of domestic and international organizations for the
development of an innovative gauge which ranks countries according to their strengths and efforts
to protect both physical and intellectual property. Given the positive affect of a country’s strong
legal framework, adequate physical property rights enforcement, and respect for intellectual property as critical
aspects to nation’s economic development, the 2007 IPRI included all three variables as core
components.
In this 2008 edition of the IPRI, case studies on select aspects of property rights in different
countries have been included in order to present a richer picture of property rights and their effects
around the world, in conjunction with the index scores themselves. The reader should note that the
case studies are presented as an addition to and not a part of the quantitative scoring and ranking of
the countries by their index scores. 
The long-term purpose of the IPRI is to amplify the role that private property plays in increasing a
nation’s economic well-being. The publication of the IPRI will continue on an annual basis and
thereby allow researchers, business leaders and government officials to regularly compare one nation
to another through time, constantly evaluating the strength of its PR regime. With this in mind, the
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authors maintained a strong fidelity to the initial sources that composed the 2007 index so that
comparisons between years will remain as consistent as possible.
However, some changes to the data sources and calculations were made. Some factors included 
in 2007 were substituted for reasons owing to both timeliness (how old was the data?) and 
coverage (how many countries were included?). A different method for re-scaling original data 
into the 0 – 10 scale was also employed, with the previous year’s rescaled results included here.
The reader is reminded that the 2008 IPRI is now in only its second year of publication. 
While acknowledging the limitations of the report as it exists, those involved in its publication
remain confident that these shortcomings will become fewer and fewer with each subsequent
edition. The ongoing Hernando de Soto Fellowship program will be the vehicle through which
continual improvement of the Index will continue.
Also, PRA would like to emphasize its appreciation for the collaboration of organizations and
institutions around the world that have provided tremendous knowledge and effort towards this
report. The network of partner organizations included in this year’s report will continue to improve
global communications of property rights issues and maximize the future value of the IPRI.
INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2008REPORT 13
Premise for the Hernando De Soto Fellowship Program
INDEX COMPOSITION AND COVERAGE
This chapter highlights the concept behind the International Property Rights Index, presents the
categories and factors included in its 2007 publication, and provides a detailed explanation on the
Index’s methodology and country set.
The Concept 
Many questions arise when conceptualizing a measure which calibrates a nation’s strength and
effectiveness in defending property rights. Critical questions such as: “Which factors should be included in
such an index?” and of great importance, “What factors are feasible to include given data constraints, especially for
developing countries?”
The concept of the International Property Rights Index is based on the definition of private
property rights presented below. The Index was then shaped by expert responses to a basic opinion
survey and personal communications with academic and business specialists in the property rights
field. The starting point for the study is that a more effective protection of private property
contributes to stronger economic growth.
Economist Armen Alchian, a contributor of some of the field’s most important works on property,
offers this definition of private property rights:
A property right is the exclusive authority to determine how a resource is used….
Private property rights have two other attributes in addition to determining the use of a resource. One is the
exclusive right to the services of the resource….
Finally, a private property right includes the right to delegate, rent, or sell any portion of the rights by exchange
or gift at whatever price the owner determines (provided someone is willing to pay that price).8
Based on this definition of private property, the study’s assumptive starting point and results derived
from the opinion survey, the IPRI is comprised of three core categories (heretofore “components”)
essential to the strength and protection of a country’s private property system:
1) Legal and Political Environment (LP)
2) Physical Property Rights (PPR)
3) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
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The Legal and Political Environment (LP) component represents the foundational environment in
which individuals can benefit from the existence of private property rights. Judicial independence
and the protection of property rights through the court system, as well as a transparent and stable
legal and political system are vital for individual rights to flourish. Variables two and three
emphasize essential aspects of regarding the protection of physical and intellectual property rights.
The variables included in these two categories account for important de jure rights and de facto
outcomes of the countries considered. 
Limitations and Future Considerations
Several things must be kept in mind when understanding the conceptualization and the outcomes of
the IPRI. First, the IPRI ranking covers a relatively high number of nations from greatly varying
economic, political and cultural backgrounds. Consequently, many of the countries’ idiosyncratic
characteristics with respect to property rights protection and strength cannot be considered here.
Second, none of the data used for the construction of the IPRI is generated by the authors themselves
but was instead collected from third-party sources such as the World Bank, World Economic Forum
and trade groups. In the future, the IPRI will likely incorporate original survey data gathered from 
and with the help of the program’s partner groups.
Additionally, a future emphasis on hard data (like those found in the piracy rates data) would go far
to eliminate the subjectivity of survey results. Additionally, combining survey results from different
sources which were conducted with different protocols, may lead to a “loss in conceptual precision”
when aggregated.9 
From the beginning of the IPRI program, there was a desire to see a robust structural model of
property rights and economic growth come out of the index results. In the near future, we hope that
this idea may come to fruition such that the resulting and extant index data may find a better fit
with the corresponding growth data, and the theoretical relationship between the property rights
institutions and growth may find a formal expression that can be tested empirically and expanded
upon by other scholars.
Finally, beginning in the third year of the index, we hope that analysis can begin to exploit the time-
series nature of the index: as each year is itself a snapshot in time of property rights around the
world, three or more of these snapshots can be used to understand the time-path of property rights.
That said, inconsistency of data sources, uneven updating of sources from year to year, and other
data anomalies will no doubt interfere in this pursuit, but we hope such constraints may be overcome. 
Variables
The 2008 IPRI comprises a total of eleven variables, which are divided into the three main
components: Legal and Political Environment (LP), Physical Property Rights (PPR), and Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR). Despite a large number of property rights related variables considered by the
authors, the final IPRI study focuses only on core factors that directly relate to the strength and
protection of private property rights. The final ranking is very similar to the alternative rankings
calculated with other factors included, and was preferred as it suffers less from the problems of
dilution and remains parsimonious. 
Of the eleven variables incorporated into the index, the “Registering Property” variable is made up
of two sub-variables. Thus, in sum the IPRI comprises twelve elements of data for each country.10
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EXHIBIT 1: Structure of the IPRI
1)  Legal and Political Environment (LP)
• Judicial Independence 
• Confidence in Courts 
• Political Stability 
• Control of Corruption 
2)  Physical Property Rights (PPR)
• Protection of Physical Property Rights 
• Registering Property 
• Access to Loans    
3)  Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
• Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
• Patent Protection
• Copyright Piracy 
• Trademark Protection 
Legal and Political Environment (LP)
The soundness of a country’s legal and political systems AND its viewpoints toward the importance
and protection of property rights represent crucial preconditions for the effective implementation
and public support for private property rights. Therefore, the following four factors are considered
in the LP category: 
Judicial Independence
This variable examines the judiciary’s freedom from influence by political and business groups. 
The independence of the judiciary is a central underpinning for the sound protection and sovereign
support of the court system with respect to private property and is therefore considered in the IPRI.
Source: World Economic Forum’s 2006-07 Global Competitiveness Index
Confidence in Courts
This variable examines the extent to which business managers are confident in the court system to
uphold their property rights. The variable is seen as complementary to the previous variable as it
specifically rates the judiciary’s way of implementing property rights in business matters. This is
important as it reflects the degree of trust that economically active individuals have in their legal
system, which then influences their engagement in business activities and investment choices.
Sources: The World Bank Group’s 2007 World Development Indicators
Political Stability
The degree of political stability crucially influences one’s incentive to obtain or extend ownership
and/or management of property. The higher the likelihood of government overthrow, the less likely
people will be to obtain property and develop a trust in the validity of the rights attached.
Source: World Bank Institute’s 2007 Governance Matters
Corruption
Corruption in the public sector is drawn from the World Bank Institute’s 2007 Governance Matters
report, which combines several indicators which measure the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain. This includes petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of
the state by elites and private interests. Similar to the other variables in the LP component,
corruption influences the people’s confidence in the existence of sound implementation and
enforcement of property rights. Corruption reflects the degree of informality in the economy, which
is a distracting factor to the expansion of respect for legal private property.
Source: World Bank Institute’s 2007 Governance Matters
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Physical Property Rights (PPR)
The PPR component encompasses three variables of high importance in private property rights
protection. It covers experts’ opinions on the definition and protection of property rights, a business’
difficulty in registering property and the ease of access to banking loans.
Protection of Physical Property Rights
This variable directly relates to the strength of a country’s property rights system as it reflects experts’
views on the quality of the judicial protection of private property, including financial assets. Additionally,
it encompasses professionals’ opinions on the clarity of the legal definition of property rights.
Source: World Economic Forum’s 2006-07 Global Competitiveness Index
Registering Property
This variable reflects businesses’ point of view on how difficult it is to register property in terms of the
number of days and procedures necessary. According to the source of this information, the variable
“records the full sequence of procedures necessary when a business purchases land and a building to
transfer the property title from the seller to the buyer.” This information is critical because the more
difficult property registration is, the more likely it is that assets stay in the informal sector, thus
restricting the development of the broader public’s understanding and support for a strong legal and
sound property rights system. It also discourages assets from moving from lower to higher valued uses.
This variable is a core component in the economic arguments set forth by Hernando de Soto.
Source: The World Bank Group’s 2007 Doing Business Report
Access to Loans
The authors decided to include this variable in the IPRI dataset because accessibility to a bank loan
represents the opportunity for an individual to subsequently obtain property. Consequently, the
easier it is to become a property owner, the stronger society’s support for a strong formalized
property rights system and the investment in property.
Source: World Economic Forum’s 2006-07 Global Competitiveness Index
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
The IPR component considers four aspects of intellectual property. More generally it evaluates the
protection of intellectual property, and additionally it reviews a country’s policies and their effectiveness
in enforcing patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
This variable contains opinion survey outcomes reflecting a nation’s protection of intellectual property,
and is therefore a crucial component of the IPR component. Expert participants in each country were
asked to rate their nations’ IP protection from “weak/non-existent” to “equal to the world’s most stringent.”
Source: World Economic Forum’s 2206-07 Global Competitiveness Index
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Patent Protection
The IPRI’s variable on patent protection strength replicates the information provided by the 2000
Ginarte-Park Index of Patent Rights, updated using 2005 data thanks to the helpful cooperation of
Walter Park. These data reflect a country’s rank in patent strength which is based on five extensive
criteria: coverage, membership in international treaties, restrictions on patent rights, enforcement,
and duration of protection.
Source: Ginatre-Park Index of Patent Rights (2005)
Copyright Piracy
The level of piracy in the IP sector is an important indicator of the performance and execution of
protecting intellectual property rights in a country. The information for this variable was collected
from the 2007 U.S. Trade Representative’s 301 Watch List Report and contains information of the
piracy level of four separate industries including Business Software, Records & Music, Motion
Pictures, and Entertainment Software. As this variable reflects de facto outcomes based on hard data,
it rates a country according to its effectiveness of protecting IPR. The Watch List Report data was
supplemented with the most updated available data from the various reporting industry groups and
the International Intellectual Property Alliance.
Source: US Trade Representative’s 2007 301 Watch List Report 
Trademark Protection
This variable reflects the opinion of experts regarding a country’s trademark protection. The issues
covered by this sub-variable cover the registration, maintenance, and enforcement of trademark
rights. The data stems from the International Trademark Association’s Report of 1998 on trademark
counterfeiting and infringement. 
Source: International Trademark Association’s 1998 Report
Explanatory Notes on Methodology
The overall grading scale of the IPRI ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 representing the strongest level
of property rights protection and 0 reflecting the non-existence of secure property rights in a
country. Similarly, each component and variable is placed on the same 0 to 10 scale.
For the calculation of the final index score, the variables within each component are averaged to derive
the score for each of the three components. The final overall IPRI score is itself the average of the
component scores. During construction of the index, a number of weighting methods for the
components were tried, based on the authors’ subjective views as well as to account for the different
variances within each variable. However, the choice of the weighting method had little impact on 
the final rating and ranking of the countries. Thus, for reasons of simplicity and objectivity, the final
numbers presented in this report are the result of the simple average which combines available variables
into the three component area ratings, which in turn are averaged into the final IPRI score. However,
the authors do not wish to imply that all components and areas in the Index are of equal importance.
Thus, readers who prefer to weight the variables in a different manner are invited to do so.
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The 11 variables included in the IPRI stem from seven different sources. In order to combine
variables that did not come in an indexed form and therefore could not be easily normalized to the
IPRI’s 0-10 scale, we applied the following standardization formula:
Xi represents the individual country’s value of the factor involved, while Xmax and Xmin were set
at the maximum value within original data set and zero, respectively. Specific notes on how original
data was rescaled for the IPRI are given later in the report along with further information on each
source. This rescaling procedure, while similar, is slightly different than that which was employed in
the initial 2007 report. As a result, using this method results in some countries’ scores being either
higher or lower (higher in most cases) and rankings resulting in a different ordering (mostly at the
top). For this reason, rescaled scores for 2007 are referred to in this report so that countries may be
directly compared between years.
The Countries
The 2008 International Property Rights Index ranks a total of 115 countries from around the world.
The selection of the countries was determined by the constraint of available data only. Covering 96
percent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product, these countries differ substantially in economic
performance and market structure. For means of comparison, the economies included in the IPRI
were assigned to nine geographic regions, which include: Latin America, Western Europe, Central
and Eastern Europe, Asia, Middle East/North Africa, Africa, Russia, Oceania and North America.
It is important to note that the number of countries covered by the IPRI’s different data sources
ranged from 40 to just over 200. Therefore the authors were provided with significant variation in
the number of potential countries to be included in the IPRI. In order to be considered for the final
IPRI ranking, a country’s data needed to be represented in a minimum of one half of the included
variables per category, although in most cases countries exceeded this threshold. Consequently,
there are some countries which do not enter any of the final country sets of the Index’s three
components, and some which met the threshold of only one or two of the components. The
countries that qualified for all three categories are the 115 included in this report.
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Xmax – Xi
Xmax – Xmin{ } *10
RESULTS
The final results of the IPRI are presented here. After a short overview of data and outcomes, the
complete 2008 IPRI scores and rankings are presented according to various criteria. In addition, the
results for individual countries are highlighted. Finally, the relationship between scores on the index
and countries economic well-being is presented.
Data and Outcome Characteristics
The IPRI’s 2008 outcomes are mainly based on data obtained from opinion surveys within the
countries rated. Generally, experts in their respective field participated in these surveys and the
resulting rating, in the form of a numeric factor, is based on their judgment. Thus, it must be
emphasized that, based on these sources, the country ranked worst or best in the IPRI is not
necessarily the one with the weakest property rights per se, but rather the one perceived to be the
worst or best. Nevertheless, the authors view the expert surveys to be a good and reliable source of
judgment related to a country’s de facto characteristics, rather than some measure of what laws and
practices may exist in statute only. Therefore, we hope that – with the help of partner institutions
around the world – we will be able to obtain greater data in the future based on opinion surveys
suited to our specific needs. 
There are a few variables based on “hard data.” For example, the numbers of procedures to register
property, or estimations of the level of piracy, were included. However, for the future development
of the Index we plan to obtain more data based on this kind of solid information. For example, it
would be valuable to include some measure of the strength of constitutional anchors of private
property protection, or the extent of land expropriation and judicial attitudes toward compensation.
Also, each year’s De Soto fellow will concentrate on seeking and including the most up-to-date
sources. The 2008 IPRI is quite nearly a one year update of the 2007 report, with some exceptions
where updated data or suitable substitutions were unavailable.
In analyzing the final outcome of the scoring process, the reader is presented with two related but
ultimately different measures of property rights protection throughout the sample: ordinal and
cardinal. The scores are presented in such a way that the reader can easily compare countries
according to how they rank relative to each other, as well as how well they score compared to each
other (and relative to the 0-10 scale). The authors hope that while the relative ranking proves
useful, it is the score itself which provides the most useful measure of how well a country protects
property rights.
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Rank Country IPRI LP PPR IPR
1 Finland 8.6 8.9 8.5 8.5
2 Norway 8.3 8.5 8.7 7.8
Denmark 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.1
Netherlands 8.3 8.2 8.6 8.0
Germany 8.3 8.3 8.1 8.4
6 Switzerland 8.2 8.6 8.1 8.0
New Zealand 8.2 8.7 8.1 7.9
United Kingdom 8.2 7.7 8.7 8.2
Sweden 8.2 8.3 8.6 7.6
10 Iceland 8.1 8.8 8.8 6.7
11 Australia 8.0 8.1 8.1 7.9
Luxembourg 8.0 8.1 7.8 8.1
13 Austria 7.9 8.0 7.8 7.9
Singapore 7.9 8.0 8.2 7.5
Ireland 7.9 7.8 8.2 7.6
16 Japan 7.7 7.5 7.5 8.2
Hong Kong 7.7 7.9 7.9 7.2
Canada 7.7 7.8 7.4 7.8
19 United States 7.5 6.6 8.0 7.9
20 Belgium 7.4 7.1 7.1 7.9
21 France 7.1 6.8 6.5 8.1
22 Portugal 7.0 6.7 7.3 7.1
23 United Arab Emirates 6.9 6.6 7.7 6.4
South Africa 6.9 6.6 7.1 7.0
25 Spain 6.7 6.4 7.3 6.4
Chile 6.7 6.7 7.2 6.1
27 Estonia 6.6 6.9 7.4 5.4
28 Malta 6.5 7.3 6.3 5.9
29 Israel 6.5 6.0 7.2 6.3
Taiwan 6.5 5.7 7.3 6.4
31 Qatar 6.4 7.0 7.0 5.3
Cyprus 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.0
Slovakia 6.4 5.6 7.2 6.3
Malaysia 6.4 6.2 7.1 5.8
35 Hungary 6.3 5.7 6.9 6.2
36 Korea (South) 6.2 5.7 6.2 6.7
India 6.2 5.9 7.4 5.2
38 Greece 6.1 6.4 6.3 5.7
39 Mauritius 6.0 6.4 6.6 4.9
40 Botswana 5.9 7.0 6.5 4.3
Tunisia 5.9 5.9 6.9 4.9
Slovenia 5.9 6.6 5.6 5.5
Italy 5.9 5.1 6.1 6.5
Costa Rica 5.9 6.6 6.1 4.9
45 Jordan 5.7 5.4 6.3 5.4
Lithuania 5.7 5.2 6.9 4.9
Kuwait 5.7 6.3 6.9 3.8
Czech Republic 5.7 5.4 5.8 5.8
49 Uruguay 5.6 6.4 5.6 4.9
Thailand 5.6 5.1 7.0 4.6
51 Jamaica 5.5 5.3 5.8 5.5
Turkey 5.5 5.3 6.0 5.1
53 Morocco 5.4 5.2 6.0 5.0
54 Trinidad and Tobago 5.3 4.9 5.4 5.7
Panama 5.3 4.2 6.9 4.9
Latvia 5.3 5.5 6.3 4.2
Poland 5.3 5.1 5.1 5.7
58 Colombia 5.2 4.2 6.0 5.5
Rank Country IPRI LP PPR IPR
59 Sri Lanka 5.1 4.3 6.0 5.1
Mali 5.1 5.0 5.3 4.9
Burkina Faso 5.1 4.8 5.1 5.3
62 Mauritania 5.0 4.8 5.1 5.2
El Salvador 5.0 4.4 6.2 4.4
Romania 5.0 4.6 5.4 5.0
China 5.0 5.1 5.5 4.4
Brazil 5.0 4.5 5.4 5.1
Bahrain 5.0 4.7 5.7 4.6
Mexico 5.0 4.1 5.8 5.1
Philippines 5.0 4.2 5.7 5.0
70 Croatia 4.9 5.5 4.8 4.5
Bulgaria 4.9 4.3 5.5 4.9
Indonesia 4.9 3.7 6.8 4.2
73 Malawi 4.8 5.4 5.4 3.6
Tanzania 4.8 5.0 4.8 4.5
Egypt 4.8 4.6 5.3 4.4
76 Vietnam 4.7 5.3 5.7 3.2
77 Benin 4.6 4.3 4.9 4.7
Dominican Republic 4.6 4.4 5.3 4.1
79 Algeria 4.5 4.8 4.8 3.9
Madagascar 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.2
81 Guatemala 4.4 3.4 5.8 4.0
Argentina 4.4 3.6 4.7 4.8
83 Ukraine 4.3 3.9 4.8 4.3
Kenya 4.3 3.5 5.5 3.9
85 Mozambique 4.2 4.1 4.8 3.8
Uganda 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.2
Kazakhstan 4.2 4.2 5.6 2.7
88 Cameroon 4.1 3.6 5.0 3.8
Peru 4.1 2.9 5.7 3.7
Honduras 4.1 4.0 4.4 3.9
Zambia 4.1 4.5 5.0 2.7
92 Russia 4.0 3.2 4.9 3.9
93 Nepal 3.9 3.0 5.5 3.3
Ecuador 3.9 2.9 4.9 4.0
Pakistan 3.9 3.0 5.8 2.8
96 Ethiopia 3.8 3.8 4.3 3.4
Macedonia 3.8 3.7 4.9 2.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.8 4.4 4.1 2.8
Armenia 3.8 3.9 5.6 1.8
100 Nicaragua 3.7 3.1 4.4 3.6
Montenegro 3.7 3.9 5.2 2.0
Bolivia 3.7 3.2 4.4 3.4
103 Guyana 3.6 3.5 5.0 2.4
Serbia 3.6 3.5 5.2 2.2
Albania 3.6 4.0 4.8 2.0
Azerbaijan 3.6 3.8 5.1 1.9
107 Nigeria 3.5 2.4 4.4 3.8
Burundi 3.5 3.2 4.3 3.0
109 Paraguay 3.4 2.6 4.7 2.9
Moldova 3.4 3.3 5.0 1.9
Angola 3.4 3.6 4.0 2.5
112 Venezuela 3.3 1.9 4.6 3.4
Chad 3.3 1.8 4.2 3.8
114 Zimbabwe 3.1 2.0 4.3 3.1
115 Bangladesh 2.9 2.1 3.7 2.9
EXHIBIT 2: By IPRI Ranking
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Albania 3.6 4.0 4.8 2.0
Algeria 4.5 4.8 4.8 3.9
Angola 3.4 3.6 4.0 2.5
Argentina 4.4 3.6 4.7 4.8
Armenia 3.8 3.9 5.6 1.8
Australia 8.0 8.1 8.1 7.9
Austria 7.9 8.0 7.8 7.9
Azerbaijan 3.6 3.8 5.1 1.9
Bahrain 5.0 4.7 5.7 4.6
Bangladesh 2.9 2.1 3.7 2.9
Belgium 7.4 7.1 7.1 7.9
Benin 4.6 4.3 4.9 4.7
Bolivia 3.7 3.2 4.4 3.4
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.8 4.4 4.1 2.8
Botswana 5.9 7.0 6.5 4.3
Brazil 5.0 4.5 5.4 5.1
Bulgaria 4.9 4.3 5.5 4.9
Burkina Faso 5.1 4.8 5.1 5.3
Burundi 3.5 3.2 4.3 3.0
Cameroon 4.1 3.6 5.0 3.8
Canada 7.7 7.8 7.4 7.8
Chad 3.3 1.8 4.2 3.8
Chile 6.7 6.7 7.2 6.1
China 5.0 5.1 5.5 4.4
Colombia 5.2 4.2 6.0 5.5
Costa Rica 5.9 6.6 6.1 4.9
Croatia 4.9 5.5 4.8 4.5
Cyprus 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.0
Czech Republic 5.7 5.4 5.8 5.8
Denmark 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.1
Dominican Republic 4.6 4.4 5.3 4.1
Ecuador 3.9 2.9 4.9 4.0
Egypt 4.8 4.6 5.3 4.4
El Salvador 5.0 4.4 6.2 4.4
Estonia 6.6 6.9 7.4 5.4
Ethiopia 3.8 3.8 4.3 3.4
Finland 8.6 8.9 8.5 8.5
France 7.1 6.8 6.5 8.1
Germany 8.3 8.3 8.1 8.4
Greece 6.1 6.4 6.3 5.7
Guatemala 4.4 3.4 5.8 4.0
Guyana 3.6 3.5 5.0 2.4
Honduras 4.1 4.0 4.4 3.9
Hong Kong 7.7 7.9 7.9 7.2
Hungary 6.3 5.7 6.9 6.2
Iceland 8.1 8.8 8.8 6.7
India 6.2 5.9 7.4 5.2
Indonesia 4.9 3.7 6.8 4.2
Ireland 7.9 7.8 8.2 7.6
Israel 6.5 6.0 7.2 6.3
Italy 5.9 5.1 6.1 6.5
Jamaica 5.5 5.3 5.8 5.5
Japan 7.7 7.5 7.5 8.2
Jordan 5.7 5.4 6.3 5.4
Kazakhstan 4.2 4.2 5.6 2.7
Kenya 4.3 3.5 5.5 3.9
Korea (South) 6.2 5.7 6.2 6.7
Kuwait 5.7 6.3 6.9 3.8
Country IPRI LP PPR IPR
Latvia 5.3 5.5 6.3 4.2
Lithuania 5.7 5.2 6.9 4.9
Luxembourg 8.0 8.1 7.8 8.1
Macedonia 3.8 3.7 4.9 2.8
Madagascar 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.2
Malawi 4.8 5.4 5.4 3.6
Malaysia 6.4 6.2 7.1 5.8
Mali 5.1 5.0 5.3 4.9
Malta 6.5 7.3 6.3 5.9
Mauritania 5.0 4.8 5.1 5.2
Mauritius 6.0 6.4 6.6 4.9
Mexico 5.0 4.1 5.8 5.1
Moldova 3.4 3.3 5.0 1.9
Montenegro 3.7 3.9 5.2 2.0
Morocco 5.4 5.2 6.0 5.0
Mozambique 4.2 4.1 4.8 3.8
Nepal 3.9 3.0 5.5 3.3
Netherlands 8.3 8.2 8.6 8.0
New Zealand 8.2 8.7 8.1 7.9
Nicaragua 3.7 3.1 4.4 3.6
Nigeria 3.5 2.4 4.4 3.8
Norway 8.3 8.5 8.7 7.8
Pakistan 3.9 3.0 5.8 2.8
Panama 5.3 4.2 6.9 4.9
Paraguay 3.4 2.6 4.7 2.9
Peru 4.1 2.9 5.7 3.7
Philippines 5.0 4.2 5.7 5.0
Poland 5.3 5.1 5.1 5.7
Portugal 7.0 6.7 7.3 7.1
Qatar 6.4 7.0 7.0 5.3
Romania 5.0 4.6 5.4 5.0
Russia 4.0 3.2 4.9 3.9
Serbia 3.6 3.5 5.2 2.2
Singapore 7.9 8.0 8.2 7.5
Slovakia 6.4 5.6 7.2 6.3
Slovenia 5.9 6.6 5.6 5.5
South Africa 6.9 6.6 7.1 7.0
Spain 6.7 6.4 7.3 6.4
Sri Lanka 5.1 4.3 6.0 5.1
Sweden 8.2 8.3 8.6 7.6
Switzerland 8.2 8.6 8.1 8.0
Taiwan 6.5 5.7 7.3 6.4
Tanzania 4.8 5.0 4.8 4.5
Thailand 5.6 5.1 7.0 4.6
Trinidad and Tobago 5.3 4.9 5.4 5.7
Tunisia 5.9 5.9 6.9 4.9
Turkey 5.5 5.3 6.0 5.1
Uganda 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.2
Ukraine 4.3 3.9 4.8 4.3
United Arab Emirates 6.9 6.6 7.7 6.4
United Kingdom 8.2 7.7 8.7 8.2
United States 7.5 6.6 8.0 7.9
Uruguay 5.6 6.4 5.6 4.9
Venezuela 3.3 1.9 4.6 3.4
Vietnam 4.7 5.3 5.7 3.2
Zambia 4.1 4.5 5.0 2.7
Zimbabwe 3.1 2.0 4.3 3.1
EXHIBIT 3: By Country
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Exhibits 2 and 3 present the 2008 International Property Rights Index ranking of the 115 economies
included in the country set, which represents 96 percent of world GDP. Finland leads the country
list with a score of 8.6 out of the possible 10. This is a second year honor for the Scandinavian
country when using rescaled scores for 2007 to conform to 2008 methodology. Indeed, Finland
scored 8.6 in 2007 according to the rescaled scores (although if one refers to the original report,
Finland scored 7.9 resulting in a rank of 11). The second position is occupied by four countries:
Norway, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands all with a score of 8.3. Norway is the only one of
these countries to have moved up into this rank (from 5), the others already having placed at
second in 2007. Rounding out the top 10 countries are Switzerland, New Zealand, United
Kingdom, and Sweden (all with 8.2) and Iceland (8.1).
At the bottom of the scores, are Azerbaijan (3.6), Nigeria (3.5), Burundi (3.5), Moldova (3.4),
Paraguay (3.4), Angola (3.4), Venezuela (3.3), Chad (3.3), Zimbabwe (3.1), and Bangladesh (2.9, up
from 2.6) once again scoring the lowest of the country set.
The average of the entire sample is 5.5, down from 5.7 the previous year. With no change in the
top score, the range decreased slightly with the bottom score having increased to 2.9 from 2.6. Still,
this range illuminates the striking disparity in property rights regimes throughout the world, as
measured by the IPRI criteria. The authors would argue that while those countries at the very
bottom of the index scoring certainly demonstrate a severe deficiency in property rights protection,
they are not alone in representing regimes with a clear need to improve. Indeed, even the top score
of 8.6 shows there is room for improvement. A logical rejoinder to the fact that a country may score
low in this index, is that different countries have different priorities, and thus improvements in other
aspects of a country’s institutional environment are unfairly ignored in this report. We would
respond that, as mentioned at the beginning, the starting assumption for this report is that a
stronger, more stringent, comprehensive private property rights regime is desirable to one that is
less, and further that this belief is reflected in the criteria used to score and rank the various
countries.
Exhibit 4 presents the IPRI rankings by quintile. The color prism relates the quartiles to a specified
color: purple for the top quintile, blue for the second quintile, green for the third, yellow for the
fourth, and red for the bottom quintile. Accordingly, the map on IPRI’s distribution, displayed in the
inside cover of this report, indicates which country belongs to which quintile. 
Exhibit 5 presents the summary statistics for the overall IPRI and components, as well as statistics
for 2007.
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EXHIBIT 4: IPRI Ranking by Quintile
Top 20% 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile Bottom 20%
Finland
Norway
Denmark
Netherlands
Germany
Switzerland
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Sweden
Iceland
Australia
Luxembourg
Austria
Singapore
Ireland
Japan
Hong Kong
Canada
United States
Belgium
France
Portugal
United Arab Emirates
South Africa
Spain
Chile
Estonia
Malta
Israel
Taiwan
Qatar
Cyprus
Slovakia
Malaysia
Hungary
Korea (South)
India
Greece
Mauritius
Botswana
Tunisia
Slovenia
Italy
Costa Rica
Jordan
Lithuania
Kuwait
Czech Republic
Uruguay
Thailand
Jamaica
Turkey
Morocco
Trinidad and Tobago
Panama
Latvia
Poland
Colombia
Sri Lanka
Mali
Burkina Faso
Mauritania
El Salvador
Romania
China
Brazil
Bahrain
Mexico
Philippines
Croatia
Bulgaria
Indonesia
Malawi
Tanzania
Egypt
Vietnam
Benin
Dominican Republic
Algeria
Madagascar
Guatemala
Argentina
Ukraine
Kenya
Mozambique
Uganda
Kazakhstan
Cameroon
Peru
Honduras
Zambia
Russia
Nepal
Ecuador
Pakistan
Ethiopia
Macedonia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Armenia
Nicaragua
Montenegro
Bolivia
Guyana
Serbia
Albania
Azerbaijan
Nigeria
Burundi
Paraguay
Moldova
Angola
Venezuela
Chad
Zimbabwe
Bangladesh
EXHIBIT 5: Summary Statistics
Indicator Mean Median Deviation Minimum Maximum
IPRI 5.5 5.3 1.5 2.9 8.6
LP 5.3 5.1 1.8 1.8 8.9
PPR 6.1 5.8 1.3 3.7 8.8
IPR 5.1 4.9 1.8 1.8 8.5
IPRI (2007) - original 5.3 4.9 1.8 2.2 8.3
IPRI (2007) - rescaled 5.7 5.5 1.7 2.6 8.6
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Ranking by Index Category
The highest score overall in any component is 8.9 for Finland in Legal and Political Environment
(LP). In 2007, the highest score overall was 8.8 for Germany in Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).
The lowest score overall in any component is a tie at 1.8 between Chad in LP and Armenia in IPR.
The highest mean score component is Physical Property Rights (PPR).
Exhibit 6 more specifically identifies the top and bottom ten countries of the IPRI and each of its
three components (the rank listed in parentheses refer to the country’s rank within that component).
And Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 give a complete rank ordering of the entire 115 country set according to
the various components. Finland ranks first in LP (8.9), Iceland first in PPR (8.8), and Finland ranks
first in IPR (8.5). At the bottom end, Chad ranks last in LP (1.8), Bangladesh ranks last in PPR (3.7),
and Armenia ranks last in IPR (1.8).
Among the top performing countries are northern European and Scandinavian countries which also
were among top performers in 2007. For example, last year Sweden, Norway, Finland and the UK
all scored among the top five in at least two out of three components. This year, the same countries
appear among the top 10 in at least two out of three components, and this time are joined by
Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Iceland and non-regional New Zealand.
At the bottom end, Bangladesh, with the weakest overall score, is joined by Zimbabwe, Chad, and
Angola as being among the lowest 10 scores in at least two out of three components. 
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Finland (1)
Norway (2)
Denmark (2)
Netherlands (2)
Germany (2)
Switzerland (6)
New Zealand (6)
United Kingdom (6)
Sweden (6)
Iceland (10)
Guyana (103)
Serbia (103)
Albania (103)
Azerbaijan (103)
Nigeria (107)
Burundi (107)
Paraguay (109)
Moldova (109)
Angola (109)
Venezuela (112)
Chad (112)
Zimbabwe (114)
Bangladesh (115)
Finland (1)
Iceland (2)
New Zealand (3)
Switzerland (4)
Norway (5)
Denmark (6)
Germany (7)
Sweden (7)
Netherlands (9)
Australia (10)
Luxembourg (10)
Nepal (106)
Pakistan (106)
Peru (108)
Ecuador (108)
Paraguay (110)
Nigeria (111)
Bangladesh (112)
Zimbabwe (113)
Venezuela (114)
Chad (115)
Iceland (1)
Norway (2)
United Kingdom (2)
Sweden (4)
Netherlands (4)
Finland (6)
Denmark (6)
Singapore (8)
Ireland (8)
New Zealand (10)
Switzerland (10)
Germany (10)
Australia (10)
Bolivia (104)
Nicaragua (104)
Nigeria (104)
Ethiopia (108)
Burundi (108)
Zimbabwe (108)
Chad (111)
Bosnia-Herzegovina (112)
Uganda (112)
Angola (114)
Bangladesh (115)
Finland (1)
Germany (2)
United Kingdom (3)
Japan (3)
Denmark (5)
Luxembourg (5)
France (5)
Netherlands (8)
Switzerland (8)
New Zealand (10)
Australia (10)
United States (10)
Austria (10)
Belgium (10)
Kazakhstan (106)
Zambia (106)
Angola (108)
Guyana (109)
Serbia (110)
Montenegro (111)
Albania (111)
Azerbaijan (113)
Moldova (113)
Armenia (115)
EXHIBIT 6: Top 10 and Bottom 10 By Category (Number indicates rank)
IPRI LP PPR IPR
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Rank Country IPRI LP PPR IPR
1 Finland 8.6 8.9 8.5 8.5
2 Iceland 8.1 8.8 8.8 6.7
3 New Zealand 8.2 8.7 8.1 7.9
4 Switzerland 8.2 8.6 8.1 8.0
5 Norway 8.3 8.5 8.7 7.8
6 Denmark 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.1
7 Germany 8.3 8.3 8.1 8.4
Sweden 8.2 8.3 8.6 7.6
9 Netherlands 8.3 8.2 8.6 8.0
10 Australia 8.0 8.1 8.1 7.9
Luxembourg 8.0 8.1 7.8 8.1
12 Austria 7.9 8.0 7.8 7.9
Singapore 7.9 8.0 8.2 7.5
14 Hong Kong 7.7 7.9 7.9 7.2
15 Ireland 7.9 7.8 8.2 7.6
Canada 7.7 7.8 7.4 7.8
17 United Kingdom 8.2 7.7 8.7 8.2
18 Japan 7.7 7.5 7.5 8.2
19 Malta 6.5 7.3 6.3 5.9
20 Belgium 7.4 7.1 7.1 7.9
21 Qatar 6.4 7.0 7.0 5.3
Botswana 5.9 7.0 6.5 4.3
23 Estonia 6.6 6.9 7.4 5.4
24 France 7.1 6.8 6.5 8.1
25 Portugal 7.0 6.7 7.3 7.1
Chile 6.7 6.7 7.2 6.1
27 United States 7.5 6.6 8.0 7.9
United Arab Emirates 6.9 6.6 7.7 6.4
South Africa 6.9 6.6 7.1 7.0
Slovenia 5.9 6.6 5.6 5.5
Costa Rica 5.9 6.6 6.1 4.9
32 Cyprus 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.0
33 Spain 6.7 6.4 7.3 6.4
Greece 6.1 6.4 6.3 5.7
Mauritius 6.0 6.4 6.6 4.9
Uruguay 5.6 6.4 5.6 4.9
37 Kuwait 5.7 6.3 6.9 3.8
38 Malaysia 6.4 6.2 7.1 5.8
39 Israel 6.5 6.0 7.2 6.3
40 India 6.2 5.9 7.4 5.2
Tunisia 5.9 5.9 6.9 4.9
42 Taiwan 6.5 5.7 7.3 6.4
Hungary 6.3 5.7 6.9 6.2
Korea (South) 6.2 5.7 6.2 6.7
45 Slovakia 6.4 5.6 7.2 6.3
46 Latvia 5.3 5.5 6.3 4.2
Croatia 4.9 5.5 4.8 4.5
48 Jordan 5.7 5.4 6.3 5.4
Czech Republic 5.7 5.4 5.8 5.8
Malawi 4.8 5.4 5.4 3.6
51 Jamaica 5.5 5.3 5.8 5.5
Turkey 5.5 5.3 6.0 5.1
Vietnam 4.7 5.3 5.7 3.2
54 Lithuania 5.7 5.2 6.9 4.9
Morocco 5.4 5.2 6.0 5.0
56 Italy 5.9 5.1 6.1 6.5
Thailand 5.6 5.1 7.0 4.6
Poland 5.3 5.1 5.1 5.7
Rank Country IPRI LP PPR IPR
China 5.0 5.1 5.5 4.4
60 Mali 5.1 5.0 5.3 4.9
Tanzania 4.8 5.0 4.8 4.5
62 Trinidad and Tobago 5.3 4.9 5.4 5.7
63 Burkina Faso 5.1 4.8 5.1 5.3
Mauritania 5.0 4.8 5.1 5.2
Algeria 4.5 4.8 4.8 3.9
66 Bahrain 5.0 4.7 5.7 4.6
67 Romania 5.0 4.6 5.4 5.0
Egypt 4.8 4.6 5.3 4.4
Madagascar 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.2
70 Brazil 5.0 4.5 5.4 5.1
Zambia 4.1 4.5 5.0 2.7
72 El Salvador 5.0 4.4 6.2 4.4
Dominican Republic 4.6 4.4 5.3 4.1
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.8 4.4 4.1 2.8
75 Sri Lanka 5.1 4.3 6.0 5.1
Bulgaria 4.9 4.3 5.5 4.9
Benin 4.6 4.3 4.9 4.7
Uganda 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.2
79 Panama 5.3 4.2 6.9 4.9
Colombia 5.2 4.2 6.0 5.5
Philippines 5.0 4.2 5.7 5.0
Kazakhstan 4.2 4.2 5.6 2.7
83 Mexico 5.0 4.1 5.8 5.1
Mozambique 4.2 4.1 4.8 3.8
85 Honduras 4.1 4.0 4.4 3.9
Albania 3.6 4.0 4.8 2.0
87 Ukraine 4.3 3.9 4.8 4.3
Armenia 3.8 3.9 5.6 1.8
Montenegro 3.7 3.9 5.2 2.0
90 Ethiopia 3.8 3.8 4.3 3.4
Azerbaijan 3.6 3.8 5.1 1.9
92 Indonesia 4.9 3.7 6.8 4.2
Macedonia 3.8 3.7 4.9 2.8
94 Argentina 4.4 3.6 4.7 4.8
Cameroon 4.1 3.6 5.0 3.8
Angola 3.4 3.6 4.0 2.5
97 Kenya 4.3 3.5 5.5 3.9
Guyana 3.6 3.5 5.0 2.4
Serbia 3.6 3.5 5.2 2.2
100 Guatemala 4.4 3.4 5.8 4.0
101 Moldova 3.4 3.3 5.0 1.9
102 Russia 4.0 3.2 4.9 3.9
Bolivia 3.7 3.2 4.4 3.4
Burundi 3.5 3.2 4.3 3.0
105 Nicaragua 3.7 3.1 4.4 3.6
106 Nepal 3.9 3.0 5.5 3.3
Pakistan 3.9 3.0 5.8 2.8
108 Peru 4.1 2.9 5.7 3.7
Ecuador 3.9 2.9 4.9 4.0
110 Paraguay 3.4 2.6 4.7 2.9
111 Nigeria 3.5 2.4 4.4 3.8
112 Bangladesh 2.9 2.1 3.7 2.9
113 Zimbabwe 3.1 2.0 4.3 3.1
114 Venezuela 3.3 1.9 4.6 3.4
115 Chad 3.3 1.8 4.2 3.8
EXHIBIT 7: Ranking by LP Score
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Rank Country IPRI LP PPR IPR
1 Iceland 8.1 8.8 8.8 6.7
2 Norway 8.3 8.5 8.7 7.8
United Kingdom 8.2 7.7 8.7 8.2
4 Sweden 8.2 8.3 8.6 7.6
Netherlands 8.3 8.2 8.6 8.0
6 Finland 8.6 8.9 8.5 8.5
Denmark 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.1
8 Singapore 7.9 8.0 8.2 7.5
Ireland 7.9 7.8 8.2 7.6
10 New Zealand 8.2 8.7 8.1 7.9
Switzerland 8.2 8.6 8.1 8.0
Germany 8.3 8.3 8.1 8.4
Australia 8.0 8.1 8.1 7.9
14 United States 7.5 6.6 8.0 7.9
15 Hong Kong 7.7 7.9 7.9 7.2
16 Luxembourg 8.0 8.1 7.8 8.1
Austria 7.9 8.0 7.8 7.9
18 United Arab Emirates 6.9 6.6 7.7 6.4
19 Japan 7.7 7.5 7.5 8.2
20 Canada 7.7 7.8 7.4 7.8
Estonia 6.6 6.9 7.4 5.4
India 6.2 5.9 7.4 5.2
23 Portugal 7.0 6.7 7.3 7.1
Spain 6.7 6.4 7.3 6.4
Taiwan 6.5 5.7 7.3 6.4
26 Chile 6.7 6.7 7.2 6.1
Israel 6.5 6.0 7.2 6.3
Slovakia 6.4 5.6 7.2 6.3
29 Belgium 7.4 7.1 7.1 7.9
South Africa 6.9 6.6 7.1 7.0
Malaysia 6.4 6.2 7.1 5.8
32 Qatar 6.4 7.0 7.0 5.3
Thailand 5.6 5.1 7.0 4.6
34 Kuwait 5.7 6.3 6.9 3.8
Tunisia 5.9 5.9 6.9 4.9
Hungary 6.3 5.7 6.9 6.2
Lithuania 5.7 5.2 6.9 4.9
Panama 5.3 4.2 6.9 4.9
39 Indonesia 4.9 3.7 6.8 4.2
40 Cyprus 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.0
41 Mauritius 6.0 6.4 6.6 4.9
42 Botswana 5.9 7.0 6.5 4.3
France 7.1 6.8 6.5 8.1
44 Malta 6.5 7.3 6.3 5.9
Greece 6.1 6.4 6.3 5.7
Latvia 5.3 5.5 6.3 4.2
Jordan 5.7 5.4 6.3 5.4
48 Korea (South) 6.2 5.7 6.2 6.7
El Salvador 5.0 4.4 6.2 4.4
50 Costa Rica 5.9 6.6 6.1 4.9
Italy 5.9 5.1 6.1 6.5
52 Turkey 5.5 5.3 6.0 5.1
Morocco 5.4 5.2 6.0 5.0
Sri Lanka 5.1 4.3 6.0 5.1
Colombia 5.2 4.2 6.0 5.5
56 Czech Republic 5.7 5.4 5.8 5.8
Jamaica 5.5 5.3 5.8 5.5
Mexico 5.0 4.1 5.8 5.1
Rank Country IPRI LP PPR IPR
Guatemala 4.4 3.4 5.8 4.0
Pakistan 3.9 3.0 5.8 2.8
61 Vietnam 4.7 5.3 5.7 3.2
Bahrain 5.0 4.7 5.7 4.6
Philippines 5.0 4.2 5.7 5.0
Peru 4.1 2.9 5.7 3.7
65 Slovenia 5.9 6.6 5.6 5.5
Uruguay 5.6 6.4 5.6 4.9
Kazakhstan 4.2 4.2 5.6 2.7
Armenia 3.8 3.9 5.6 1.8
69 China 5.0 5.1 5.5 4.4
Bulgaria 4.9 4.3 5.5 4.9
Kenya 4.3 3.5 5.5 3.9
Nepal 3.9 3.0 5.5 3.3
73 Malawi 4.8 5.4 5.4 3.6
Trinidad and Tobago 5.3 4.9 5.4 5.7
Romania 5.0 4.6 5.4 5.0
Brazil 5.0 4.5 5.4 5.1
77 Mali 5.1 5.0 5.3 4.9
Egypt 4.8 4.6 5.3 4.4
Dominican Republic 4.6 4.4 5.3 4.1
80 Montenegro 3.7 3.9 5.2 2.0
Serbia 3.6 3.5 5.2 2.2
82 Poland 5.3 5.1 5.1 5.7
Burkina Faso 5.1 4.8 5.1 5.3
Mauritania 5.0 4.8 5.1 5.2
Azerbaijan 3.6 3.8 5.1 1.9
86 Zambia 4.1 4.5 5.0 2.7
Cameroon 4.1 3.6 5.0 3.8
Guyana 3.6 3.5 5.0 2.4
Moldova 3.4 3.3 5.0 1.9
90 Benin 4.6 4.3 4.9 4.7
Macedonia 3.8 3.7 4.9 2.8
Russia 4.0 3.2 4.9 3.9
Ecuador 3.9 2.9 4.9 4.0
94 Croatia 4.9 5.5 4.8 4.5
Tanzania 4.8 5.0 4.8 4.5
Algeria 4.5 4.8 4.8 3.9
Mozambique 4.2 4.1 4.8 3.8
Albania 3.6 4.0 4.8 2.0
Ukraine 4.3 3.9 4.8 4.3
100 Argentina 4.4 3.6 4.7 4.8
Paraguay 3.4 2.6 4.7 2.9
102 Madagascar 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.2
Venezuela 3.3 1.9 4.6 3.4
104 Honduras 4.1 4.0 4.4 3.9
Bolivia 3.7 3.2 4.4 3.4
Nicaragua 3.7 3.1 4.4 3.6
Nigeria 3.5 2.4 4.4 3.8
108 Ethiopia 3.8 3.8 4.3 3.4
Burundi 3.5 3.2 4.3 3.0
Zimbabwe 3.1 2.0 4.3 3.1
111 Chad 3.3 1.8 4.2 3.8
112 Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.8 4.4 4.1 2.8
Uganda 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.2
114 Angola 3.4 3.6 4.0 2.5
115 Bangladesh 2.9 2.1 3.7 2.9
EXHIBIT 8: Ranking by PPR Score
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Rank Country IPRI LP PPR IPR
1 Finland 8.6 8.9 8.5 8.5
2 Germany 8.3 8.3 8.1 8.4
3 United Kingdom 8.2 7.7 8.7 8.2
Japan 7.7 7.5 7.5 8.2
5 Denmark 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.1
Luxembourg 8.0 8.1 7.8 8.1
France 7.1 6.8 6.5 8.1
8 Netherlands 8.3 8.2 8.6 8.0
Switzerland 8.2 8.6 8.1 8.0
10 New Zealand 8.2 8.7 8.1 7.9
Australia 8.0 8.1 8.1 7.9
United States 7.5 6.6 8.0 7.9
Austria 7.9 8.0 7.8 7.9
Belgium 7.4 7.1 7.1 7.9
15 Norway 8.3 8.5 8.7 7.8
Canada 7.7 7.8 7.4 7.8
17 Sweden 8.2 8.3 8.6 7.6
Ireland 7.9 7.8 8.2 7.6
19 Singapore 7.9 8.0 8.2 7.5
20 Hong Kong 7.7 7.9 7.9 7.2
21 Portugal 7.0 6.7 7.3 7.1
22 South Africa 6.9 6.6 7.1 7.0
23 Iceland 8.1 8.8 8.8 6.7
Korea (South) 6.2 5.7 6.2 6.7
25 Italy 5.9 5.1 6.1 6.5
26 United Arab Emirates 6.9 6.6 7.7 6.4
Spain 6.7 6.4 7.3 6.4
Taiwan 6.5 5.7 7.3 6.4
29 Israel 6.5 6.0 7.2 6.3
Slovakia 6.4 5.6 7.2 6.3
31 Hungary 6.3 5.7 6.9 6.2
32 Chile 6.7 6.7 7.2 6.1
33 Cyprus 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.0
34 Malta 6.5 7.3 6.3 5.9
35 Malaysia 6.4 6.2 7.1 5.8
Czech Republic 5.7 5.4 5.8 5.8
37 Greece 6.1 6.4 6.3 5.7
Trinidad and Tobago 5.3 4.9 5.4 5.7
Poland 5.3 5.1 5.1 5.7
40 Colombia 5.2 4.2 6.0 5.5
Jamaica 5.5 5.3 5.8 5.5
Slovenia 5.9 6.6 5.6 5.5
43 Estonia 6.6 6.9 7.4 5.4
Jordan 5.7 5.4 6.3 5.4
45 Qatar 6.4 7.0 7.0 5.3
Burkina Faso 5.1 4.8 5.1 5.3
47 India 6.2 5.9 7.4 5.2
Mauritania 5.0 4.8 5.1 5.2
49 Turkey 5.5 5.3 6.0 5.1
Sri Lanka 5.1 4.3 6.0 5.1
Mexico 5.0 4.1 5.8 5.1
Brazil 5.0 4.5 5.4 5.1
53 Morocco 5.4 5.2 6.0 5.0
Philippines 5.0 4.2 5.7 5.0
Romania 5.0 4.6 5.4 5.0
56 Tunisia 5.9 5.9 6.9 4.9
Lithuania 5.7 5.2 6.9 4.9
Panama 5.3 4.2 6.9 4.9
Rank Country IPRI LP PPR IPR
Mauritius 6.0 6.4 6.6 4.9
Costa Rica 5.9 6.6 6.1 4.9
Uruguay 5.6 6.4 5.6 4.9
Bulgaria 4.9 4.3 5.5 4.9
Mali 5.1 5.0 5.3 4.9
64 Argentina 4.4 3.6 4.7 4.8
65 Benin 4.6 4.3 4.9 4.7
66 Thailand 5.6 5.1 7.0 4.6
Bahrain 5.0 4.7 5.7 4.6
68 Croatia 4.9 5.5 4.8 4.5
Tanzania 4.8 5.0 4.8 4.5
70 El Salvador 5.0 4.4 6.2 4.4
China 5.0 5.1 5.5 4.4
Egypt 4.8 4.6 5.3 4.4
73 Botswana 5.9 7.0 6.5 4.3
Ukraine 4.3 3.9 4.8 4.3
75 Indonesia 4.9 3.7 6.8 4.2
Latvia 5.3 5.5 6.3 4.2
Madagascar 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.2
Uganda 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.2
79 Dominican Republic 4.6 4.4 5.3 4.1
80 Guatemala 4.4 3.4 5.8 4.0
Ecuador 3.9 2.9 4.9 4.0
82 Kenya 4.3 3.5 5.5 3.9
Russia 4.0 3.2 4.9 3.9
Algeria 4.5 4.8 4.8 3.9
Honduras 4.1 4.0 4.4 3.9
86 Kuwait 5.7 6.3 6.9 3.8
Cameroon 4.1 3.6 5.0 3.8
Mozambique 4.2 4.1 4.8 3.8
Nigeria 3.5 2.4 4.4 3.8
Chad 3.3 1.8 4.2 3.8
91 Peru 4.1 2.9 5.7 3.7
92 Malawi 4.8 5.4 5.4 3.6
Nicaragua 3.7 3.1 4.4 3.6
94 Venezuela 3.3 1.9 4.6 3.4
Bolivia 3.7 3.2 4.4 3.4
Ethiopia 3.8 3.8 4.3 3.4
97 Nepal 3.9 3.0 5.5 3.3
98 Vietnam 4.7 5.3 5.7 3.2
99 Zimbabwe 3.1 2.0 4.3 3.1
100 Burundi 3.5 3.2 4.3 3.0
101 Paraguay 3.4 2.6 4.7 2.9
Bangladesh 2.9 2.1 3.7 2.9
103 Pakistan 3.9 3.0 5.8 2.8
Macedonia 3.8 3.7 4.9 2.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.8 4.4 4.1 2.8
106 Kazakhstan 4.2 4.2 5.6 2.7
Zambia 4.1 4.5 5.0 2.7
108 Angola 3.4 3.6 4.0 2.5
109 Guyana 3.6 3.5 5.0 2.4
110 Serbia 3.6 3.5 5.2 2.2
111 Montenegro 3.7 3.9 5.2 2.0
Albania 3.6 4.0 4.8 2.0
113 Azerbaijan 3.6 3.8 5.1 1.9
Moldova 3.4 3.3 5.0 1.9
115 Armenia 3.8 3.9 5.6 1.8
EXHIBIT 9: Ranking by IPR Score
Results
Special Country Cases
Finland
This year’s top performer in the IPRI overall ranking holds on to its highest overall score with a
consistent 8.6, same as in 2007. Browsing Finland’s scores within each component, one sees that its
overall high score comes as no surprise, with the highest score in both LP (8.9) and IPR (8.5), as
well as a tie for sixth with Denmark in PPR (8.5). 
Among the specific variables, Finland had the second highest score for both Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights and Patent Protection and within the top 20 in Copyright Protection.
Within the PPR component, Finland ties for seventh in Property Rights Protection and Access to
Loans, and ties for 13th in Registering Property. Finally, Finland ties for eighth in Judicial
Independence, is third in Political Stability, and is first with a perfect 10.0 in Control of Corruption.
All other variables are not available due to a lack of data.
Bangladesh
The country once again perceived to be the weakest protector of property rights is Bangladesh.
With an overall score of 2.9, which is up from last year’s lowest score of 2.6, Bangladesh as
mentioned earlier is among the lowest five scores in two components (LP and PPR). In PPR,
Bangladesh scored 4.7 in Property Rights Protection, 4.1 in Registering Property, and 2.3 in Access
to Loans. In LP, the country scored 2.5 in Judicial Independence, 1.7 in Confidence in Courts, 1.8 in
Political Stability, and 2.4 in Control of Corruption. Finally in IPR, Bangladesh scored 1.8 in
Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 3.7 in Patent Protection, and 3.0 in Copyright Protection,
with no available data in Trademark Protection.
These individual variable score paint the picture (as they did in 2007) of a country with a long way
to go in order to secure the private property rights of its citizens in such a way that ensures strong
economic growth and security.
.
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Regional Distribution of IPRI
EXHIBIT 10: Average Performance by Region and Component
EXHIBIT 11: Average Performance by Region
REGION IPRI LP PR IPR
All Countries 5.5 5.3 6.1 5.1
North America 6.7 6.2 7.0 6.9
Latin America 4.6 4.0 5.4 4.4
Africa 4.5 4.3 5.0 4.1
Middle East/North Africa 5.6 5.6 6.2 5.0
Western Europe 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.5
CEE and Russia 4.7 4.6 5.6 3.9
Asia/Oceania 5.9 5.5 6.6 5.5
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EXHIBIT 13: Relationship between IPRI and GDP Per Capita (with fitted line)
IPRI and Economic Well-Being
The relationship between effective property rights protection and economic performance is
certainly of high interest to countries and policy makers. Exhibit 12 below provides a broad stroke
picture of the increasing wealth of countries which more strongly protect private property.
EXHIBIT 12: Average Income by Quintile
IPRI QUARTILES AV. GDP P.C.
Top 20 Percent $35,638
2nd Quintile $19,029
3rd Quintile $8,924
4th Quintile $5,309
Bottom 20 Percent $3,817
In this case, the countries in the top quintile of IPRI scores enjoy a per capita income that is more
than nine times that of their counterparts in the bottom quintile.
As seen in Exhibit 13, the IPRI score trends strongly with GDP per capita. In fact, using a simple
regression to determine the relationship, the relationship exhibits a statistically significant positive
relationship, with a correlation coefficient of 0.85 and an explanatory power (r-squared) of 0.71.
According to the relationship fitted between the two data sets using the simple regression, a one
point increase in the IPRI score predicts a $7,616 increase in per capita GDP. 
This positive relationship also holds when using the individual component scores as the independent
variable. For LP, the correlation coefficient is 0.80; for PPR, it is 0.79; and for IPR it is 0.81.
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EXHIBIT 14: Relationship between LP and GDP Per Capita
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EXHIBIT 16: Relationship between IPR and GDP Per Capita
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EXHIBIT 15: Relationship between PPR and GDP Per Capita
To take it one step further, using a multiple regression technique to fit all three components to GDP
per capita results in the following relationship:
GDP Per Capita = 1832.93*LP + 2804.45*PPR + 3066.43*IPR – 27447.07
with the coefficients on the LP and PPR term both significant at the 95% level, and the IPR
coefficient and intercept terms significant at the 99% level.
Overall it would appear the relationship between the IPRI score, as well as its component parts, and
average income is unfailingly strong. Of note is the fact that in the multiple regression model,
Intellectual Property Rights appears to have both the most significant correlation as well as the
highest coefficient, predicting a higher return to income with improvement in this component. The
intuition does comport with literature showing a higher return to investment in intellectual
properties (technology, process improvement, etc.). However, one should be careful to draw this
inference since only a correlation is shown here. Indeed, the causation might very well run the other
way, with richer countries both more able and more willing to protect intellectual property since
they have a larger share of their economy devoted to such pursuits.
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CASE STUDIES
This section contains more in-depth analysis of the interaction between property rights and
economic activity, among a handful of selected countries. The reader should keep in mind that these
case studies are not to be viewed as extensions of the Index methodology or scoring themselves, but
rather as related material meant to provide a richer picture of the complex subject of private
property rights. As mentioned in the introduction of this report, the main purpose of the IPRI is to
provide a macro view snapshot of the state of property rights around the world. In so doing, the
authors are invariably limited in the amount of detail they can provide on the contours of specific
policies and situations within each country – this is due to both the constraint of time and resources
as well as the desire to provide a consistent comparison across countries.
With this in mind, the underlying motivation for the IPRI is to provide a greater understanding of
property rights such that policymakers may hopefully devote more and more effort to improving
them within their own countries. We hope these case studies will help in this pursuit, and taken
together with the primary metric provided by the Index, will better inform the reader about the
broader issue.
CASE STUDY #1: LANGA TOWNSHIP, SOUTH AFRICA
by Karol Boudreaux
Introduction 
The idea of providing poor people with legal title to their property to improve security and increase
investment is not new. In Africa, systematic title registration projects took place in Sudan and
Buganda (present-day Uganda) before the Second World War12. In the post-war era, important land
titling projects were implemented in Kenya in the 1950s and in Malawi in the 1970s. The list does
not stop here; a dozen other African countries have experimented with private titling projects.13
Unfortunately, the results of these efforts have been disappointing. In Kenya, in particular, titling
enriched politically well-connected individuals at the expense of the poor and also reduced women’s
control of land. In Somalia, scholars found no significant correlation between titling and
investments in agriculture.14
The question that reformers and property-rights advocates face is this: can titling projects in the
developing world live up to their promise? Perhaps, but if a country’s rule of law is weak, if it has
high transaction costs for property transfers, or if it erects barriers that limit entrepreneurship, then
the benefits of titling will be muted. Property reform should always be considered in light of the
broader legal, regulatory, and customary environment. A lack of detailed local knowledge will
imperil any titling project. 
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The South African experiment 
In South Africa, efforts to create a more secure form of tenure for black citizens have been
underway for decades. The results of this experiment are visible in Langa Township, located just
outside Cape Town.15
Langa is one of the country’s oldest townships, created just after World War I. Black South Africans
who came to Cape Town looking for work hoped to find shelter in one of Langa’s residential hostels
or in one of the few homes built to house black families. Properties in Langa were not available for
sale, residents could only lease a home or a space in a hostel. Highly discriminatory legislation
barred them from owning property in Langa. 
Change began in the 1970s, under the apartheid-era National Party government, when long-term leases
were approved for residents of black townships. In 1986, the government introduced legislation to allow
black urban dwellers, such as the residents of Langa, to purchase freehold title to their homes.16 The
post-apartheid ANC government transferred significant numbers of titles to occupants. 
Today, many of Langa’s residents do have freehold title to their concrete houses. The government
hoped that transferring title to occupants would stimulate economic growth and alleviate poverty.
Government policy makers believed that once occupants had secure title to their houses, they
would leverage this asset in economically creative ways and begin to pull themselves and their
families out of poverty.17
What happened in Langa after citizens gained title to their property is instructive. Many residents
have improved their homes.18 Other residents use their house as a secure and cost-effective place to
do businesses. However, there seems to be little use of titles as collateral for commercial loans.
A brief history 
In response to the great influenza epidemic of 1918, Cape Town officials moved some of the city’s
black residents to an outlying area, away from whites. The area was named Langa. Laws predating
this move prevented the black residents from buying land in Langa, and instead, the Cape Town
city council, which owned all the land and buildings in the township, rented space to black
residents. 
Throughout the twentieth century black South Africans moved to cities, hoping to find work. Despite
laws that made such movement very difficult and poor living conditions, rural residents continued to
flow into urban areas. The white governments were unable, and unwilling, to supply adequate housing
for these new residents. Supply did not increase to meet demand and the result was a substantial
housing shortage, the growth of informal squatter settlements, and the extensive use of backyard shacks
as homes. Langa, like other townships, suffered from all these problems and more.
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In 1994, the ANC-led government of National Unity took office, and faced a tremendous housing
problem: millions of people needed better housing, the existing housing stock was of a poor quality,
and most black citizens lived far from city centers and faced long and costly commutes. High
unemployment rates and widespread poverty compounded these problems. The Housing Act of
1997 attempted to address these problems, but to this day, the government continues to struggle
with housing issues. 
Despite continuing problems, there are signs that more secure tenure is promoting investment and
generating opportunities for entrepreneurship in Langa and in other townships across South Africa.19
Homes as a place of business
Lelapa Restaurant sits on a quiet side street in Langa. It has worldwide reputation among travelers
for good food and a friendly atmosphere, thanks to the hard work of Sheila Mahloane and her
daughter Monica.
Sheila has lived in her home on Harlem Street since 1960. Whether by necessity or instinct (or both)
she has developed into a successful entrepreneur, using her home as space for her business. Back in the
1960s, nine people shared the one-bedroom house. Today, up to 60 people share it for a meal.
Throughout her life Sheila faced and overcame adversity. Before opening Lelapa, Sheila held a
number of jobs, often in the informal sector. She went to school at night and then full-time to
complete her education. She learned food service at one of her jobs, running the food concession at
a local high school. By 1996, she was looking for a change. 
Happily for Sheila, change was all around her. The new South Africa was only two years old, and
tourists wanted to see the townships. However, tour companies were unsure of the reception they
would get from the local people, and simply drove the tourists through the townships in large, air-
conditioned buses.
Alert to opportunity, Sheila decided to turn their home into a restaurant, with her daughter Monica, to
take advantage of the growing tourist trade. However, converting their home into a restaurant required
money, and Sheila could not get a commercial loan, as she had spent much of her life working in the
informal sector. To overcome this common problem, she raised capital by selling clothing. 
After three years of preparation, Shelia and Monica opened Lelapa. In the seven years since
opening, the house has been progressively converted into a restaurant. Today, in addition to
providing work for herself and Monica, she employs five women full-time and she hires high-school
boys to play music and sing on some evenings.
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Sheila’s story of perseverance and entrepreneurial spirit provides one example of how secure tenure
provides a basis for the creation and expansion of a strong business. Before 1994, Sheila would have
faced serious obstacles to turning her home into a restaurant: by law, black residents had limited
opportunities to open formal businesses in townships. Further, as a renter, Sheila had few incentives
to improve her property. 
However, with her secure title Sheila faces different incentives and has invested in her property. She
now reaps the benefits of using her property in a profitable way. Sheila went from being an
employee to being an employer. She provides steady work for five people and part-time work and
experience for several more. Sheila’s efforts, and the efforts of other home-based entrepreneurs, are
helping to relieve poverty in Langa.
House improvement spurs economic activity
By providing Langa’s residents with a secure title to their property, government officials gave people
like Sheila incentives to invest money to improve their homes. Throughout Langa, a wide variety of
house improvements are underway. Some of these are small-scale upgrades to windows and doors.
Some involve the addition of wrought iron fencing to the front of a house. Other residents undertake
more substantial upgrades that involve adding a room or rooms and upgrading the interior space.
Exterior improvements are clearly visible throughout Langa, but interior changes are also taking
place, though they may escape a visitor’s eyes. Homeowners who renovate their kitchen often hire
cabinet-makers, electricians, and tile layers. They buy appliances, paint, and wallpaper, to the
benefit of the local hardware stores. When Langa residents are unable do renovations themselves
they tend to hire other Langa residents, keeping work in the township and signaling artisan-
entrepreneurs to develop or improve their skills. The demand for artisans, bricklayers, carpenters,
and masons means that more people have incentives to acquire these skills and set up shop
(typically in their homes) to meet the demand of Langa residents. 
Incremental change is the norm
Ronald Mhlongo is one resident who has used local artisans to improve his home. Mr. Mhlongo has
lived in his home in Langa since 1984. Initially, laws forced him to rent his four-room home from
the city government. The city did a poor job of maintaining rental housing for black residents and
Mr. Mhlongo’s house had a host of problems. Nonetheless, in the late 1980s, when new legislation
gave black urban residents an opportunity to buy their homes, Mr. Mhlongo took advantage of the
legal change and became a homeowner. 
Over the years, he has made extensive improvements to his house. He saved a little money to pay
for replastering. Then, he saved a bit more and added a ventilator. He added two more rooms (a
sitting area/living room and another bedroom) and also a “granny flat” in the backyard that serves as
bedrooms for two of his sons and for a grandson.
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Mr. Mhlongo never thought of going to a bank for a loan to pay for the work on his house because
he did not want to pay interest. Without a permanent job, he believed that it would be very difficult
to repay a commercial loan. Instead, he prefers to save and then make improvements. 
Mr. Mhlongo’s approach to house improvement is typical of Langa. In the late 1980s and in the
1990s, residents acquired title to run-down properties in desperate need of improvement. New
homeowners had an incentive to improve their property because improvements would increase the
value of their new asset. 
However, because Langa’s residents often work in the informal sector and have irregular incomes,
qualifying for a commercial loan is difficult. Instead of seeking larger commercial loans, they rely on
savings clubs and their small personal savings to fund improvements. To date, relatively few
alternatives to commercial lending have sprung up in the townships. The availability of micro-lending
in South Africa is rather limited and, regardless, people expressed a preference for using personal
savings and working with familiar savings clubs instead of working with unknown bank officials.20
For these reasons, among others, traditional banks play little part in the typical Langa home-
improvement project. Instead, homeowners slowly improve their properties using personal savings
and pay-outs from savings clubs. These improvements, however incremental, increase the value of
the property and the homeowners’ wealth—wealth that most homeowners expect to hand down to
their children. 
Homeownership is a path towards wealth creation insofar as it creates incentives to invest in and
improve an asset: one’s house. Investing in human capital or in a business can also create wealth. 
It is possible that people might use title to a house as collateral for a loan that would allow them to
invest in human or other capital, but in Langa this seems to happen infrequently. Instead, wealth
tends to be created by investing using personal savings. 
Why people don’t use titles to secure loans 
Freehold titles can, in some settings, promote tenure security.21 In turn, secure tenure provides
people with incentives to invest in their property, to care for it, and to maintain it because the
homeowners reap the rewards of doing so.22 When it comes time to sell a house, a well-maintained
house fetches a higher sale price than a poorly maintained house. 
In addition, one of the benefits of freehold title is that title holders can typically mortgage their
land. Many property owners in the developed world use property titles as collateral for commercial
credit. Loans from a commercial lender can help start a business, pay for medical expenses or
education, or some other activity. The right to mortgage property is one of the many “sticks” in the
bundle of rights attached to freehold title. So why are more title holders not using this stick to
obtain loans and build or expand businesses, improve their homes, or fund education?
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We identified several important reasons for the pattern of reliance on personal savings and savings
clubs over commercial loans in Langa. Among them are the following: 
• Risk. People do not want to risk losing their home for these reasons:
1.) due to rigid labor regulations, a growing segment of South African’s labor force works in the
informal sector.23 Informal sector workers are self-employed and have variable income streams,
making it difficult to meet mortgage bond payments and making use of commercial credit risky.24
Commercial lenders also view informal sector workers as high-risk borrowers (as compared with
people employed by the formal sector) and therefore not good candidates for loans;
2.) given the significant housing shortage in South Africa, replacing one’s home, if lost, would
be very difficult. The most likely result of losing a home would be a family moving into the
house of a relative or into a shack;
3.) many formal residences have an informal shack in the backyard, home to a relative or a
source of rental income for the homeowner. If a home was foreclosed and lost, the ability to
house family members and/or the right to rental income would also be lost; 
4.) homes also often serve as the locus for a business. If the house is placed at risk by a
commercial loan, so too is the place of business;
5.) the home has a very high cultural value as the family “seat.” Parents and possibility
grandparents lived in the house, and typically the current owner wants to keep the home to
give to his or her children25; and
6.) for people who lived with severe insecurity under apartheid governments, it may be
especially valuable to hold ownership rights and the increased sense of security these
provide. Black South Africans faced enormous institutional barriers in obtaining formal
housing in the Cape Town area. For those who fought hard to get a house, retaining the
house may have a high sentimental value.
• Trust issues. As noted, many Langa residents rely on personal savings and savings clubs to finance
home renovations. Trust and reliability seems to play an important role in this choice. Savings clubs
members feel strong social pressures to participate in a timely fashion, making payouts fairly
dependable. Savings club members know each other and engage in repeated, face-to-face dealings.
A person who does not pay into the monthly pot is less likely to be able to participate in a savings
club in the future. 
On the other hand, people who live in Langa often see commercial banks as overly formal,
unwelcoming, and costly (due both to interest payments and the time it takes to get a loan). 
While they may trust their next-door neighbor in a savings club, they may not trust a loan officer
who they do not know. Further, for many, the peace of mind that comes from being debt-free and
using savings makes personal savings and savings clubs preferable to commercial loans.
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Other problems and barriers homeowners face 
In addition to the problems outlined above, other, more formal, institutional barriers exist and
impede economic development tied to the benefits of titling. 
• The unnecessary costs of government monopoly. Though property is bought and sold in
Langa, transfers are often informal, due to high transaction costs. Sellers must prove that they
have paid any taxes they owe before legally transferring property. In addition, specialized
(hence particularly expensive) conveyancing attorneys are required to formally transfer property.
These lawyers are the only ones allowed by law to transfer properties in the Deeds Registry.
Conveyancers’ fees impose undue burdens on poorer citizens who often avoid these costs and
transfer property informally with an affidavit. As a result, the Deeds Registry becomes increasing
inaccurate. The government has partially addressed this problem by eliminating duties on lower-
valued properties, but the monopoly of conveyancers remains. 
• Poor quality of local governance. Local governments lack the capacity and/or the will to
provide residents with a safe and clean local environment, and place roadblocks in the path of
commercial and residential property development. Residents resent the lack of service and fail to
pay local taxes, creating a Catch-22 as residents are required to prove their taxes have been paid
in order to formally transfer property. Moreover, many have people reported obstructionist
behavior on the part of local officials, when attempting to improve properties. 
• Problems related to crime. In a high crime environment, homeowners may limit their home
improvement projects. Too nice a home (with, for example, a second story or perhaps a garden)
may signal wealth to possible thieves and may make the home or its occupants a target. 
• Access to financing. Many point to the lack of mortgage financing for low-income earners as a
problem in the South African financing environment. The government has tried to address this
problem but banks have been slow to lend to low-income borrowers. Further, as interest rates in
South Africa remain high, this makes commercial loans more expensive.
• The high cost of formality. Just like Americans, South Africans can start businesses. However,
while it is relatively easy and inexpensive for Americans to create a formal business, it is costly
for South Africans to do the same. Instead, many entrepreneurs opt to open informal businesses.
If government policies made opening a business less costly and more attractive, the pace of
economic development might well increase and people might be more willing to use titles as
collateral to expand businesses or to invest in human and other forms of capital.
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Conclusion
The experience in Langa Township is illustrative of the complexities of any titling project. No one
receives title to property in an institutional vacuum. If a titling project is undertaken in a weak
institutional environment, where elites are likely to capture the benefits of legal change or where
there is a large informal sector, the project may have limited benefits. Wealthier, better educated
citizens may manipulate the changed legal environment to their advantage. Informal-sector workers
may shy away from the use of commercial credit. Transactions costs associated with legal
professionals may give poorer citizens incentives to transfer property informally. All of these
problems and more can and do exist. Thus, for any titling project to have a hope of success, it must
be based on strong local knowledge of institutional strengths and weaknesses. 
The evidence from Langa suggest that titles, when they are secure, do give people incentives to invest
and maintain their property, to support local artisans and building supply stores. This goes some way
towards stimulating the local economy. However, for poor people to truly unlock the full value of titles,
governments need to do a much better job of improving the broader institutional climate. 
CASE STUDY #2: BUENOS AIRES,ARGENTINA
by Sebastian Galiani and Ernesto Schargrodsky
Introduction 
The fragility of property rights is considered a crucial obstacle for economic development. The
main argument is that individuals underinvest if others can seize the fruits of their investments. In
today’s developing world, a pervasive manifestation of feeble property rights are the millions of
people living in urban dwellings without possessing formal titles of the plots of land they occupy.
Land-titling programs have been recently advocated in policy circles as a powerful instrument for
poverty reduction. Hernando De Soto emphasizes that the lack of property rights impedes the
transformation of the wealth owned by the poor into capital.26 Proper titling could allow the poor to
collateralize the land. In turn, this credit could be invested as capital in productive projects,
promptly increasing labor productivity and income. Inspired by these ideas, and fostered by
international development agencies and private institutions, land-titling programs have been
launched throughout developing and transition economies as part of poverty alleviation efforts.
The important question is then the following: Are land-titling programs a powerful tool to reduce
poverty or will the societies that adopt them face another policy delusion? In other words, what are
the causal effects of urban land titling? To answer this question is not easy at all. To identify what
would happen to a family if they receive the title to the plot of land they inhabit instead of staying
in that piece of land without the legal title is complicated: the problem is that we do not observe
the same families in both situations. 
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A natural experiment
Thus, any attempt to answer the above questions has to compare families with and without land titles.
However, the allocation of property rights across households is usually not random but based on
wealth, family characteristics, individual effort, previous investment levels, or other mechanisms built on
differences between the groups that acquire those rights and the groups that do not. Exogenous
variability in the allocation of property rights is necessary to solve this selection problem. 
In a series of recent papers we address this selection problem by exploiting a natural experiment in
the allocation of urban land titles to a very deprived population in Argentina.27
The natural experiment exploited in these papers actually started in 1981, when about 1,800 landless
families organized by a Catholic chaplain occupied a wasteland in the San Francisco Solano area, on the
outskirts of Buenos Aires, Argentina. At the time of the occupation the squatters thought the land
belonged to the state, but they later found out that it was private property. The occupied area turned
out to be made up of 13 tracts of land belonging to different private owners, which were partitioned by
the squatters into small, urban-shaped parcels for each household. The squatters resisted several eviction
attempts during the military government. After Argentina’s return to democracy in 1984 the Congress
of the Province of Buenos Aires passed a law expropriating the land from the former owners, in
exchange for monetary compensation to be paid by the government, and allocating it to the squatters.
The resulting titling process, however, was incomplete and asynchronous. The government made a
compensation offer to each original owner calculated in proportion to the official tax valuation of each
tract of land, which had been set by the fiscal authority to calculate property taxes before the land
occupation. The government offers were very similar (in per-square-meter terms) for the 13 land tracts.
Each of the original owners had to decide whether to accept the expropriation compensation proposed
by the government or to start a legal dispute with the aim of obtaining higher compensation. 
In 1986 eight of the 13 former owners accepted the compensation offered by the government. 
The formal land titles that secured the property rights to the parcels were then transferred by the 
state to the squatters in 1989. However, five former owners did not accept the compensation offered 
by the government and disputed the expropriation payment in the slow Argentine courts. Thus the
process of expropriation was incomplete. One of these five trials ended in 1998, and this tract of land
was transferred to the squatters. The other four lawsuits were still pending at the time of writing.
A random allocation
A result of this episode is that today there are two groups of squatters living in very close proximity
to each other, one of which has formal property rights (because its members live on parcels of land
that used to belong to the former owners who accepted the expropriation or whose lawsuit ended)
and the other of which remains untitled (because its members occupied parcels of land belonging to
the challenging owners). This allocation of land titles was unrelated (more precisely, exogenous) to
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the squatters’ characteristics. At the time of the occupation the squatters did not know that the land
had private owners, nor that an expropriation law was going to be passed, nor which parcels of land had
owners who would accept (or dispute) the compensation offer, nor which eventual lawsuits could end
first. Titled and untitled households arrived at the same time and were similar at the time of their arrival.
A statistical comparison of the household characteristics of these two groups prior to receiving the
treatment (that is, prior to one group receiving titles) shows that the hypothesis of random assignment
of land titles during this natural experiment cannot be rejected. That is, there are no significant
differences between the treatment and control groups in the age, gender, years of education, and other
characteristics of the family member who was the household head at the time of the occupation. There
are also no differences in plot characteristics. Moreover, the squatters had no participation in the legal
process between the government and the former owners, and the values of the dwellings they
constructed were explicitly excluded from the calculation of the expropriation compensation.
Obtaining property rights depended on the decision of the original owners to challenge the
expropriation as well as on the resolution of these legal processes. Given that these factors were
exogenous to the squatters, it is possible to study the effect of the intervention “to give property
rights” by comparing individuals who received and did not receive land titles, but who live in very
close proximity, had similar pretreatment characteristics, and have been exposed to similar life
experiences (with the exception of the treatment).
Experimental results
On credit
Do titled households have more access to credit? The evidence provided suggests that there is not
much difference on this respect. In addition, we do not find differences at all in their actual
earnings. Titled and untitled households have similar total earnings.28 Thus, should we conclude that
entitling the urban poor is not a sensible policy? Not necessarily.
On housing investment
The possession of land titles may affect the incentives to invest in housing construction through
several concurrent mechanisms, beyond credit access: 
1.) The traditional view emphasizes security from seizure. Individuals underinvest if others may
seize the fruits of their investments. 
2.) Land titles can also encourage investment by improving the transferability of the parcels.
Even if there were no risk of expropriation, investments in untitled parcels would be highly
illiquid, whereas titling reduces the cost of alienation of the assets. 
3.) A third mechanism is that land titles provide poor households with a valuable savings tool.
Poor households, especially in unstable macroeconomic environments, lack appropriate
savings instruments. Land titles allow households to substitute present consumption and
leisure into long-term savings in real property.
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Empirically the impact of legal land titles on housing investment indicates that entitled families own
today much better houses than untitled families. There are large effects of land titling on the
probability of having walls and roof of good quality. The proportion of houses with good quality
walls rises by 40 percent under land titling, while the increase reaches 47 percent for good quality
roof. The results also suggest a statistically significant increase of about 12 percent in constructed
surface under the presence of land titles. Finally, the study finds that a variable summarizing the
overall aspect of each house using an index from 0 to 100 shows a large and significant effect of
land titling on housing quality. Relative to the baseline average sample value, the estimated effect
represents an overall housing improvement of 37 percent associated to titling.
Thus, we can conclude that moving a poor household from usufructuary rights to full property rights
substantially improves housing quality. The estimated effects are large and robust, and seem to be the
result of changes in the economic returns to housing investment induced by land titling. Thus, this micro
evidence supports the hypothesis that securing property rights significantly increases investment levels.
On household size and structure
The possession of land titles may also affect the size and structure of households. There are several
potential reasons for that to happen. Insurance motives seem to be the most important. The poor
lack access to well-functioning insurance markets and pension systems that could protect them
during bad times and retirement. With limited access to risk diversification, to savings instruments,
and to the social security system, the need for insurance has to be satisfied by other means. A
traditional provider of insurance among the poor is the extended family. Another possibility is to
use children as future insurance.
Moreover, the lack of land titles might reduce the ability of household heads to restrict their relatives
from residing in their houses. In addition, untitled households may feel the need to increase the number
of family members in order to protect their houses from occupation by other squatters.29
Indeed large differences exist in household size between titled and untitled families. Untitled families
have an average of 6.06 members, while titled households have 0.95 members less. The difference in
household size seems to originate in two factors. First, there is a higher presence (0.68 members) of
non-nuclear relatives in untitled households. Untitled households report a much larger number of
further relatives of the household head who are not her/his spouse or offspring (i.e., siblings, parents, in-
laws, grandchildren, etc.) than entitled households. Second, the entitled households show a smaller
number of offspring of the household head born after the title allocation.30
On children’s outcomes
Earlier seminal work advances the presence of parental trade-offs between the quantity and the
quality of children. This trade-off appears because limited parents’ time and resources are spread
over more children. If land titling causes a reduction in fertility, it could also induce households to
increase educational investments in their children.31
We explore this hypothesis by looking at differences in educational outcomes. They show that for
the offspring of the household head in the 5-13 age group in the early-treated households (the
group of children for which they find a reduction in the number of members), there is a large effect
on school achievement. The children in the control group show an average delay of 1.09 years in their
school achievement, whereas this delay is 0.42 years shorter for the children in the early-titled parcels.32
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Moreover, exploring the effects of land titling on child health shows that children in the titled
parcels enjoy better Weight-for-Height scores than those in the untitled parcels, although there are
no significant differences in Height-for-Age measures. In addition, finds that teenage girls in the
titled parcels show lower pregnancy rates than those in the untitled parcels. In the sample under
study, teenage pregnancy is an important problem. 11.4% of the 14 to 17 years-old girls for whom
an answer to their question on teenage pregnancy was provided, were or had been pregnant at least
once. They find that the pregnancy rate was substantially higher in the untitled parcels (20.8%)
than in the titled parcels (7.9%).33
Thus, entitling the poor enhances their investment both in the house and on the human capital of
the children of the entitled families, which will reduce their poverty in the future.
On formation of beliefs
Finally, exploiting this rare natural experiment, we most recently studied the formation of beliefs
among squatters and found a significant difference in the beliefs that squatters with and without
legal titles declare to hold. The measure of beliefs are obtained through survey questions designed
to broadly capture beliefs that appear important to the workings of a market economy, namely
individualism, materialism, the role of merit, and trust.34
The set of beliefs declared by squatters with property rights are significantly different from those
held by squatters without titles. The change in beliefs is consistently in the direction of what can
loosely be called “Market Beliefs” (for example, in the sense that they are more individualist and
materialist). This is interesting because of the strong similarities in the lives of squatters with and
without titles. Moreover, the estimated causal effect is sufficiently large so as to make the beliefs of
squatters with legal titles comparable to those held by the Buenos Aires general population. This is
interesting because of the remarkable differences in the lives these two groups lead.35
Conclusion
The study of institutions and their effect on behavior, economic development, and beliefs presents
an opportunity to isolate and identify those policies that are most effective in helping societies
defeat poverty. However, rare is the opportunity to study the effect of policy changes in an
experimental nature such as the one discussed here. Doing so allows us make confident assessments
about changes caused by the policy change itself (the “treatment”), rather other factors which may
be simply correlated to the change and caused by other unobserved phenomena. 
Thus the studies presented here, using a fortunate but uncommon exogenous change in titling status
of squatters outside of Buenos Aires, allows us to peer into the decisions of households under
different ownership status but with everything else held constant. Our results present evidence on
the different channels through which policies on property rights could affect development and
ultimately reduce poverty. By examining differences in housing quality, household composition and
size, child health and education outcomes, and beliefs, we find that land-titling programs are indeed
effective in causing changes in outcomes; changes that are positive and likely to aid in families’
battle against poverty.
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IPRI AND GENDER EQUALITY 
During the development phase of the initial International Property Rights Index, several academics and
experts in this field emphasized the importance of gender equality with regard to property. As women
play a crucial role in society and the economy, and their access to property rights matter for both, we
decided to appropriately account for a component covering gender equality.
The Concept
Women’s rights, with regard to property, are regularly taken for granted in industrialized countries but
are often non-existent in countries of the developing world (both in practice and now and again in
written statute). To account for the aspect of gender equality, this report integrates an idea to extend the
standard IPRI measure with a measure of gender equality (GE) concerning property rights. The general
formula of this modified index (IPRI(GE)) that considers gender aspects is the following:
IPRI(GE) = IPRI + 0.2*GE
The weight of 0.2 for the gender equality measure was chosen somewhat arbitrarily by the authors
and the reader is invited to change this weight according to his/her preference. The construction of
the GE measure is based on the five indicators displayed in Exhibit 17.
• Women’s Access to Land
• Women’s Access to Bank Loans 
• Women’s Access to Property Other Than Land 
• Inheritance Practices
• Women’s Social Rights *
*This indicator is a composite of five other variables combined to represent “women’s social rights.”
EXHIBIT 17: Structure of the Gender Equality Component (GE)
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The Variables
Women’s Access to Land/Women’s Access to Property 
Other than Land/Women’s Access to Bank Loans
These three variables are integrated in the GE component as they indicate the quality of women’s
ownership rights with respect to three aspects: women’s access to bank loans, their right to acquire and
own land, and the right to own property other than land. The rating on these factors indicates the
extent of restrictions or the size of the female population for which restrictions are relevant. However,
some restrictions may only be relevant for a woman in a specific stage of her life (e.g. married women).
Source: OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Data Base (GID).
Inheritance Practices
This factor covers inheritance practices, ranking countries on the degree to which regulations
preference male heirs. In other words, this variable indicates to which extent bequests are equally
shared between male and female offspring. 
Source: OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Data Base (GID).
Women’s Social Rights
Women’s Social Rights is the only variable that covers broader aspects of women’s equality. For
2007, the data for this variable was taken from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data set.
However, since this source was not updated since 2004, the authors elected to create a composite
social rights variable that would mirror the 2007 source so that GE scores between years would be
comparable, but also so that a consistently updated source could be employed. The data for this
variable now comes from the same source as the other variables, but is composed of a simple
composite of the following measures: Repudiation, Parental Authority, Female Genital Mutilation,
Freedom of Movement, and Ration of Female-to-Male Adult Literacy. 
Source: OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Data Base (GID).
Methodology
The methodology of the GE component is identical to the one used to construct the IPRI. The final GE
score is also an index based on the average of equally weighted variables, which ranges on a scale of 0
to 10. This, a score of 0 signifies complete discrimination against women, while a 10 is given to
countries with fully developed equal rights of ownership between the sexes. Given that all the factor’s
basic data sets were constructed as indices, we simply normalized the data to the 0-10 scale.36
Consequently, for the final IPRI(GE) ranking, a 0-12 scale results due to the 0.2 weighting for GE.
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EXHIBIT 18: By IPRI(GE) Ranking
Rank Country IPRI (GE) GE
1 Finland 10.6 10.0
2 Norway 10.3 10.0
Denmark 10.3 10.0
Netherlands 10.3 10.0
Germany 10.3 10.0
6 Sweden 10.2 10.0
New Zealand 10.2 10.0
United Kingdom 10.2 10.0
Switzerland 10.2 10.0
10 Australia 10.0 10.0
11 Austria 9.9 10.0
Ireland 9.9 10.0
13 Canada 9.7 10.0
Japan 9.7 10.0
15 United States 9.5 10.0
16 Belgium 9.4 10.0
17 France 9.1 10.0
18 Portugal 9.0 10.0
19 Spain 8.7 10.0
Chile 8.7 10.0
21 Estonia 8.6 10.0
22 Malta 8.5 10.1
23 Hungary 8.3 10.0
24 Israel 8.2 8.3
25 Mauritius 8.0 10.0
26 Malaysia 7.9 7.7
Costa Rica 7.9 10.0
Italy 7.9 10.0
29 United Arab Emirates 7.8 4.6
Korea (South) 7.8 8.0
31 South Africa 7.7 4.0
Czech Republic 7.7 10.0
33 Uruguay 7.6 10.0
Thailand 7.6 9.9
35 Tunisia 7.4 7.6
36 Poland 7.3 10.0
Turkey 7.3 9.0
Panama 7.3 10.0
39 Colombia 7.2 10.0
40 India 7.1 4.7
Kuwait 7.1 7.1
42 Brazil 7.0 10.0
Romania 7.0 10.0
Mexico 7.0 10.0
Philippines 7.0 9.9
Rank Country IPRI (GE) GE
46 Bulgaria 6.9 10.0
El Salvador 6.9 9.4
Sri Lanka 6.9 8.8
49 China 6.7 8.3
50 Dominican Republic 6.6 10.0
Jordan 6.6 4.4
Morocco 6.6 5.8
53 Indonesia 6.5 8.2
54 Botswana 6.4 2.6
Argentina 6.4 10.0
Madagascar 6.4 9.3
57 Ukraine 6.3 10.0
58 Egypt 6.2 7.0
Bahrain 6.2 5.8
60 Vietnam 6.0 6.6
61 Burkina Faso 5.9 4.2
Malawi 5.9 5.6
Ecuador 5.9 10.0
Peru 5.9 9.0
Benin 5.9 6.4
66 Mauritania 5.8 4.0
Armenia 5.8 9.9
Russia 5.8 8.8
69 Honduras 5.7 8.2
Nicaragua 5.7 10.0
Algeria 5.7 5.9
72 Mali 5.5 1.9
73 Bolivia 5.4 8.5
Paraguay 5.4 10.0
75 Venezuela 5.3 10.0
76 Tanzania 5.2 2.1
77 Cameroon 5.1 4.9
Mozambique 5.1 4.3
79 Albania 5.0 7.1
Kenya 5.0 3.5
81 Ethiopia 4.9 5.7
82 Zambia 4.8 3.4
83 Angola 4.6 6.1
Uganda 4.6 2.1
85 Nepal 4.5 3.2
86 Pakistan 4.4 2.4
87 Nigeria 4.1 3.0
88 Chad 3.7 2.1
Zimbabwe 3.7 3.1
Bangladesh 3.7 3.8
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EXHIBIT 19: By GE Score
Rank Country IPRI (GE) GE
1 Malta 8.5 10.1
2 Finland 10.6 10.0
Norway 10.3 10.0
Denmark 10.3 10.0
Netherlands 10.3 10.0
Germany 10.3 10.0
Sweden 10.2 10.0
New Zealand 10.2 10.0
United Kingdom 10.2 10.0
Switzerland 10.2 10.0
Australia 10.0 10.0
Austria 9.9 10.0
Ireland 9.9 10.0
Canada 9.7 10.0
Japan 9.7 10.0
United States 9.5 10.0
Belgium 9.4 10.0
France 9.1 10.0
Portugal 9.0 10.0
Spain 8.7 10.0
Chile 8.7 10.0
Estonia 8.6 10.0
Hungary 8.3 10.0
Costa Rica 7.9 10.0
Czech Republic 7.7 10.0
Uruguay 7.6 10.0
Poland 7.3 10.0
Colombia 7.2 10.0
Brazil 7.0 10.0
Dominican Republic 6.6 10.0
Argentina 6.4 10.0
Nicaragua 5.7 10.0
Paraguay 5.4 10.0
Italy 7.9 10.0
Panama 7.3 10.0
Bulgaria 6.9 10.0
Ukraine 6.3 10.0
Venezuela 5.3 10.0
Romania 7.0 10.0
Mexico 7.0 10.0
Ecuador 5.9 10.0
Mauritius 8.0 10.0
43 Thailand 7.6 9.9
Armenia 5.8 9.9
Philippines 7.0 9.9
Rank Country IPRI (GE) GE
46 El Salvador 6.9 9.4
47 Madagascar 6.4 9.3
48 Turkey 7.3 9.0
Peru 5.9 9.0
50 Russia 5.8 8.8
Sri Lanka 6.9 8.8
52 Bolivia 5.4 8.5
53 Israel 8.2 8.3
China 6.7 8.3
55 Indonesia 6.5 8.2
Honduras 5.7 8.2
57 Korea (South) 7.8 8.0
58 Malaysia 7.9 7.7
59 Tunisia 7.4 7.6
60 Albania 5.0 7.1
Kuwait 7.1 7.1
62 Egypt 6.2 7.0
63 Vietnam 6.0 6.6
64 Benin 5.9 6.4
65 Angola 4.6 6.1
66 Algeria 5.7 5.9
67 Morocco 6.6 5.8
Bahrain 6.2 5.8
69 Ethiopia 4.9 5.7
70 Malawi 5.9 5.6
71 Cameroon 5.1 4.9
72 India 7.1 4.7
73 United Arab Emirates 7.8 4.6
74 Jordan 6.6 4.4
75 Mozambique 5.1 4.3
76 Burkina Faso 5.9 4.2
77 South Africa 7.7 4.0
Mauritania 5.8 4.0
79 Bangladesh 3.7 3.8
80 Kenya 5.0 3.5
81 Zambia 4.8 3.4
82 Nepal 4.5 3.2
83 Zimbabwe 3.7 3.1
84 Nigeria 4.1 3.0
85 Botswana 6.4 2.6
86 Pakistan 4.4 2.4
87 Chad 3.7 2.1
Tanzania 5.2 2.1
Uganda 4.6 2.1
90 Mali 5.5 1.9
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Results and Comparison
Exhibit 18 presents the results of the extended IPRI integrating the gender equality (GE) variables.
The reader will notice the results are reported for only 90 countries instead of the 115 countries
included in the IPRI ranking. This is due to data constraints.
One will notice the final IPRI(GE) ranking resembles a similar pattern of the IPRI ranking. Of
course this is due to the relatively low weight of 0.2given the GE component. However, when
testing alternative weights such as 0.3, similar patterns emerges with only slight differences. Again,
Finland, Norway, Germany, Netherlands and Denmark all remain top performers. And once again
Bangladesh is the lowest-ranked country, with a GE score of 3.8 (placing it 79 out of 90 within the
GE component). 
One will also notice a heavy grouping of countries at tied for the top with a score of 10.0 in the GE
component. This is the result of a somewhat generous measure employed in the underlying data
source (the GID). This unfortunately eliminates a great deal of potential variance which might have
been used to create more dispersion among the GE rankings. In the future, other possible sources
may be incorporated in order to get around this problem. However, we still feel the final IPRI(GE)
scores and rankings accurately reflect the relative strength of each country along the criteria of this
particular score. 
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DATA SOURCES 
During the development phase of the initial International property Rights Index, several academics and
experts in this field emphasized the importance of gender equality with regard to property. As women
play a crucial role in society and the economy, and their access to property rights matter for both, we
decided to appropriately account for a component covering gender equality.
Subjective versus Objective Data
The majority of data included in the IPRI stems from expert survey responses. However, some
factors also reflect “hard” data based on the countries’ regulations, laws, and actual estimates of
magnitudes (for instance, piracy). Readers might wonder why the Index consist of such a mix of
objective and subjective data.
First, objective data that reflects a country’s strength in property rights protection is almost impossible
to obtain beyond a narrow scope of parameters, so that there are few alternatives to relying on
subjective data collections. Second, rather than merely summarizing a country’s de jure facts regarding
property rights protection, IPRI aims at also capturing de facto outcomes and prevailing effectiveness of
the property rights system. Perceptions-based measures often contain information that is not reflected
by objective measures, particularly in developing countries. In fact the research for the initial IPRI in
2007 focused mainly on the latter intention, and therefore integrated a large amount of data stemming
from the experience and perceptions of experts in the field. In the future, the authors will continue to
consider alternative compositions of subjective and objective data.
Data Sources
World Economic Forum (WEF) – Global Competitiveness Index:
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report supplies information regarding an
economy’s competitiveness for a large set of countries (125 for 2006-07). The rankings are drawn
from a combination of publicly available hard data and the results of the Executive Opinion Survey.
The latter is a comprehensive survey conducted on an annual basis by the WEF, together with its
network of partner institutes (leading research institutes and business organizations) in the countries
covered by the report.
There are four variables in the IPRI for which data has been obtained from the 2006-07 WEF Global
Competitiveness Report: “Judicial Independence,” “Property Rights,” “Ease of access to loans,” and
“Intellectual Property Protection.” The specific questions that were used to elicit a response are
displayed in a chart elsewhere in this report. For more detailed information on the Global
Competitiveness Report, visit:
http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm. 
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World Bank Group (WB) – World Development Indicators:
The World Development Indicators compile statistics to provide an annual snapshot of the progress
in the developing world and the challenges that remain. It is a product of intensive collaboration
with numerous international organizations, government agencies, and private and nongovernmental
organizations. The indicators are obtained from numerous levels, starting with censuses and
household surveys. Nongovernmental organizations and the private sector also make important
contributions, both in gathering primary data and in organizing their results.
One variable from the World Development Indicators was used for the IPRI: “Confidence in
Courts..” The World Development Indicators obtained this data from the responses to the World
Bank’s Investment Climate Surveys. For more information on this data, see:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:21298138~
pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html. 
World Bank Institute (WBI) – Worldwide Governance Indicators:
The Worldwide Governance Indicators stem from the World Bank Institute and draw on the most
recent data available on an annual basis. That is, the most recent report (2007) actually contains
data gathered from multiple years within the last decade. The World Governance Indicators reflect
the perceptions on governance of a very diverse group of respondents: hundreds of variables are
drawn from more than fifty sources and organizations. Several of the data sources are surveys of
individuals or domestic firms with first-hand knowledge of the governance situation in their country.
But the report also captures the perception of country analysts at the major multilateral
development agencies, reflecting these individuals’ in-depth experience working on the countries
they assess. Other data sources from NGOs, as well as commercial risk rating agencies, base their
assessments on a global network of correspondents typically living in the country they are rating.
The variables “Political Stability” and “Control of Corruption” are drawn from this source. For more
information, see: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/.
World Bank Group (WB) – Doing Business:
The source of the “Registering Property” variable is from the World Bank Group’s Doing Business
Report 2007. The Doing Business data is collected in a standardized way on an annual basis. To
start, the Doing Business team, with academic advisors, designs a survey. The survey uses a simple
business case to ensure comparability across countries and over time – with assumptions about the
legal form of the business, its size, its location and the nature of its operations. Surveys are
administered through more than 5,000 local experts, including lawyers, business consultants,
accountants, government officials and other professionals routinely administering or advising on
legal and regulatory requirements. For more information, see: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
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Ginarte-Park (GP) – Index of Patent Rights:
The source of the “Patent Protection” variable in the IPRI come from the Ginarte-Park Index of 2005.
The GP Index is based on “macro” legal features (and not on micro-level data) and incorporates a subset
of legal features in existence in each country. The information used to construct the GP Index is
obtained directly from national patent laws and contains five categories: the extent of coverage of
patent protection, membership in international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection,
enforcement mechanisms, and the duration of protection. The most recent data set itself was obtained
directly from the authors, but for a more in-depth discussion of the index, its methodology, and older
data please refer to following paper: Juan Carlos Ginarte and Walter Park, “Determinants of Patent
Rights: A Cross-National Study,” Research Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3, October 1997, pp. 283-301.
United States Trade Representative (USTR) – 301 Watch List
The data used for the construction of the “Copyright Piracy” factor stem from the 2007 USTR 301
Watch List, which every year is published in detail on the website of the International Intellectual
Property Alliance. The data used in the IPRI reflects the estimated level of piracy in the business
software, entertainment software, motion pictures, and record industries. Representative institutions
of the individual industries estimate their data in different ways. It is reasonable to assume that the
piracy levels reported are actually underestimated as they only capture piracy experienced by the
US copyright-based industries. For more information, see:
http://www.iipa.com/2007_SPEC301_TOC.htm.
International Trademark Association (INTA) – Trademark Protection Survey:
The country information on trademark protection reflects the outcomes of INTA’s Trademark
Protection Survey. The data for this variable is obtained from the responses of a survey that was 
sent to 230 INTA members with knowledge of the level of trademark protection. The survey
consists of 13 questions covering registration, maintenance, and enforcement of trademark rights.
The limitations of this only numeric source found for trademark protection on an international scale
are the following: first, the year of publication of the survey is 1998 and can thus only be seen as a
proxy for countries’ current level of trademark protection; second, the coverage of the survey nets
only 40 countries thus making this source of limited use in the IPR component. Future editions of
the IPRI will focus heavily on finding a suitable alternative to this source, or otherwise recreating
the survey so that it may reflect more updated information. For more information, see:
http://www.iipa.com/2007_SPEC301_TOC.htm. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – Gender, Institutions and
Development Data Base (GID):
The OECD GID is the sole source of data used for construction of the IPRI(GE) rankings which
incorporates aspects of gender equality. The GID is a tool for researchers and policy makers to
determine and analyze obstacles to women’s economic development. It covers a total of 162 countries
and comprises an array of fifty indicators on gender discrimination. The nine GID variables, which
are incorporated in the GE component, are related to women’s access to loans, access to land, access
to non-land property, inheritance practices and social rights. These data have been compiled from
various sources like BRIDGE, the Asian Development Bank, the Canadian International Development
Agency, and AFROL. For more information, see:
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_2649_33935_39323280_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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CONCLUSION
The 2008 edition of the International Property Rights Index is the second and most recent edition
of an annual series of reports begun in 2007. The report is the primary focus of the Hernando de
Soto Fellowship program, begun in 2006 to support the report’s conceptualization, research, and
authorship, and promotion. In conjunction with several dozen partner organizations throughout the
world, the report’s primary aim is to promote awareness of the importance of property rights,
broadly defined, to economic growth and well-being. Additionally, the authors hope that the report
itself will be a useful resource for efforts by other researchers and policymakers to promote
improved property rights in their own countries.
As this is the second year of the program, this second edition should be seen as an improved but not
perfected project. Each year hence, the Hernando de Soto program will focus on continuing to
refine the report by incorporating better data sources, expanding the content through additional
and more varied case studies, and exploring different ways of analyzing the data and developing a
sophisticated model through which to understand the relationship between property rights and
economic development.
We invite feedback regarding additional ways to improve the IPRI in future years. Although it is, as
far as we know, the most comprehensive study available focusing exclusively on property rights, our
goal is for the IPRI to become the premier cross-country property rights study available, and a first-
stop resource for interested researchers and policymakers.
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Uganda
Kazakhstan
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Sri Lanka
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Mexico
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Qatar
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Hungary
Korea (South)
India
Greece
Mauritius
Botswana
Tunisia
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Italy
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Czech Republic
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Thailand
Jamaica
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Morocco
Latvia
Trinidad and Tobago
Panama
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Columbia
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Finland
Norway
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands
Switzerland
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Sweden
Iceland
Australia
Luxembourg
Austria
Singapore
Ireland
Japan
Hong Kong
Canada
United States
Belgium
France
Portugal
United Arab Emirates
South Africa
Spain
Chile
Estonia
Malta
■ 2007     ■ 2008
INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2008REPORT62
Study conducted by Satya Thallam, 2007 Hernando de Soto Fellow
Variable Name 
in Corresponding
Database
Original
Scale
Rescaling Method
used for IPRI
Year Number of 
Countries
Included in
Original 
Database
Source More Detailed 
Information About Source
Data
included
in 2007
Index?
Judiciary
Independence
1=no, 
heavily
influenced: 
7=yes, 
entirely
independent
The original data 
was rescaled to 
a scale of 0 - 10
2006
- 
2007
125 World Economic Forum—
Global Competitiveness Report
The ranking reflects 
experts' answers to 
the survey question: 
"Is the judiciary in your country
independent from political 
influence of members of
government, citizens or firms?"
Yes
(updated)
Confidence 
in Courts to uphold 
Property Rights
Percentage (100 - Vi)/10 2007 92 The World Bank Group—
World Development Indicators (Table 5.2)   
Measures the percentage of
managers who do not agree 
with the statement: 
"I am confident that the judicial
system will enforce my contractual
and property rights in business
disputes." Collected as an indicator
in the WDI's Investment climate:
enterprise surveys 
Yes
(updated)
Political Stability -2.5( worst)
–
2.5 (best)
The original data 
was rescaled to a scale 
of 0 - 10
2007 201 World Bank Institute—
Governance Matters 2007: 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
1996-2006
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/
home.htm
Combines several indicators 
which measure perceptions of the
likelihood that the government 
in power will be destabilized 
or overthrown by possibly 
unconstitutional and/or violent
means, including domestic violence
and terrorism.
Yes
(updated)
Control of
Corruption
-2.5( worst)
–
2.5 (best)
The original data 
was rescaled to a scale 
of 0 - 10
2007 199 World Bank Institute—
Governance Matters 2007: 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
1996-2006
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/
home.htm
Combines several indicators 
which measure the extent 
to which public power 
is exercised for private gain,
including petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites 
and private interests.
No
LP Sources
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Variable Name 
in Corresponding
Database
Original
Scale
Rescaling Method
used for IPRI
Year Number of 
Countries
Included in
Original 
Database
Source More Detailed 
Information About Source
Data
included
in 2007
Index?
Property Rights 1 (worst) 
– 
7 (best)
The original data 
was rescaled to 
a scale of 0 - 10
2006
- 
2007
125 World Economic Forum—
Global Competitiveness Report
Survey participants were asked 
to comment: "Property rights,
including over financial assets: 
(1) = are poorly defined and not
protected by law
to (7) = are clearly defined and 
well protected by law."
Yes
(updated)
Registering 
Property
Actual 
Number
The "Registering Property"
variable is a weighted
average of the source's
"Procedures to register
property" and "Days to
register property" data, 
with 30% of the weight
given to the former 
and 70% to the latter. 
The standardization 
formula used to calculate 
the zero-to-10 rescaling 
for this component was: 
10 * 
((Vmax - Vi)/(Vmax - Vmin)),
with Vmax and Vmin 
set equal to the maximum 
value in the data set range
and 0, respectively.
2007 178 The World Bank Group—
Doing Business 2007
http://www.doingbusiness.org/
Number of procedures 
legally required to register 
property and time spent (in days) 
in completing the procedures. 
This indicator assumes a
standardized case of an 
entrepreneur who wants 
to purchase land and a building 
in the largest business city.
Yes
(updated)
Ease of access 
to loans
1 (worst) 
– 
7 (best)
The original data 
was rescaled to a scale 
of 0 - 10
2007 125 World Economic Forum—
Global Competitiveness Report
Survey participants were asked:
"How easy is it to obtain 
a bank loan in your country 
with only a good business plan 
and no collateral? 
(1 = impossible, 7 = easy)".
Yes
(updated)
PPR Sources
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Variable Name 
in Corresponding
Database
Original
Scale
Rescaling Method
used for IPRI
Year Number of 
Countries
Included in
Original 
Database
Source More Detailed 
Information About Source
Data
included
in 2007
Index?
Intellectual 
Property 
Protection
1 (worst) 
– 
7 (best)
The original data 
was rescaled to 
a scale of 0 - 10
2006
- 
2007
125 World Economic Forum—
Global Competitiveness Report
Survey participants were 
asked to comment: 
“Intellectual property protection 
in your country: 
(1) = is weak or nonexistent 
to (7) = is equal to the world's 
most stringent.”
Yes
(updated)
Patent 
Protection
1 (worst) 
– 
5 (best)
The original data 
was rescaled to 
a scale of 0 - 10
2005 122 Ginarte-Park Index (obtained from the
author). For full description of data and
original citation, see Walter G. Park and
Juan Carlos Ginarte, “Intellectual Property
Rights and Economic Growth,”
Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 15,
Iss. 3, pp. 51-61, July 1997     
A country's rank in patent 
strength is based on five 
extensive criteria: 
coverage, 
membership in 
international treaties, 
restrictions on patent rights,
enforcement, 
and duration of protection.
Yes
(updated)
Copyright 
Piracy 
TLevel
Percentage Calculation per industry:
(100 - Vi)/10. 
The average of all
industries' piracy level 
was taken to calculate 
final rescaled value.
2007 61 Special 301 Report 
(International Intellectual 
Property Alliance) 
submitted to the 
United States Trade Representative
http://www.iipa.com/2007_SPEC301_TOC.htm.
Additional data was obtained 
from IIPA member associations 
including 
Business Software Alliance and 
Motion Picture Association of America
Special 301 is an annual review
process used in fighting
international copyright piracy. It
starts with the submission of public
comments, of which IIPA's annual
report is one of the most extensive
and useful in terms of data.
Yes
(updated)
Trademark 
Protection
1 (worst) 
– 
5 (best)
The original data 
was rescaled to a scale 
of 0 - 10
1998 40 International Trademark Association:
Trademark Protection Survey
http://www.inta.org/index.php
The data is obtained from 
the survey that was sent 
to 230 INTA members with
knowledge of the level of 
trademark protection available 
in the 40 countries in the study. 
The survey consists of 
13 questions covering registration,
maintenance, and enforcement 
of trademark rights.
Yes 
IPR Sources
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Variable Name 
in Corresponding
Database
Original
Scale
Rescaling Method
used for IPRI
Year Number of 
Countries
Included in
Original 
Database
Source More Detailed 
Information About Source
Data
included
in 2007
Index?
Women's access 
to land
0 (best) 
– 
1 (worst)
The original data 
was rescaled to 
a scale of 0 - 10
2006 107 OECD Gender, Institutions and
Development Data Base (GID)
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_
2649_33935_39323280_1_1_1_1,00.html
The Gender, Institutions 
and Development Data Base 
(GID-DB) represents a new tool 
for researchers and policy makers 
to determine and analyse obstacles
to women’s economic development.
It covers an array of 60 indicators 
on gender discrimination. 
The data base has been compiled
from various sources.
Yes
Women's access 
to bank loans
0 (best) 
– 
1 (worst)
The original data 
was rescaled to 
a scale of 0 - 10
2006 107 OECD Gender, Institutions and
Development Data Base (GID)
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_
2649_33935_39323280_1_1_1_1,00.html
The Gender, Institutions 
and Development Data Base 
(GID-DB) represents a new tool 
for researchers and policy makers 
to determine and analyse obstacles
to women’s economic development.
It covers an array of 60 indicators 
on gender discrimination. 
The data base has been compiled
from various sources.
Yes
Women's access 
to property 
other than land
0 (best) 
– 
1 (worst)
The original data 
was rescaled to 
a scale of 0 - 10
2006 107 OECD Gender, Institutions and
Development Data Base (GID)
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_
2649_33935_39323280_1_1_1_1,00.html
The Gender, Institutions 
and Development Data Base 
(GID-DB) represents a new tool 
for researchers and policy makers 
to determine and analyse obstacles
to women’s economic development.
It covers an array of 60 indicators 
on gender discrimination. 
The data base has been compiled
from various sources.
Yes
Inheritance 
practices
0 (best) 
– 
1 (worst)
The original data 
was rescaled to a scale 
of 0 - 10
2006 107 OECD Gender, Institutions and
Development Data Base (GID)
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_
2649_33935_39323280_1_1_1_1,00.html
The Gender, Institutions 
and Development Data Base 
(GID-DB) represents a new tool 
for researchers and policy makers 
to determine and analyse obstacles
to women’s economic development.
It covers an array of 60 indicators 
on gender discrimination. 
The data base has been compiled
from various sources.
Yes 
Women's
social rights 
(ad hoc)
0 (best) 
– 
1 (worst)
This component of 
the gender equality
indicator is a simple
composite of five variables
in the GID. The original
data of each variable was
rescaled to a scale of 0 - 10
and then averaged to
determine the score for
“women's social rights.”
2006 107 OECD Gender, Institutions and
Development Data Base (GID)
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_
2649_33935_39323280_1_1_1_1,00.html
The five components 
to the “women's social rights”
component are: Repudiation,
Parental Authority, 
Female Genital Mutilation, 
Freedom of Movement, 
and Ratio of female to male 
adult literacy.
No
GE Sources
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APPENDIX III: REGIONAL DIVISION OF COUNTRIES 
Region Country
Africa Angola
Africa Benin
Africa Botswana
Africa Burkina Faso
Africa Burundi
Africa Cameroon
Africa Chad
Africa Ethiopia
Africa Kenya
Africa Malawi
Africa Mali
Africa Mauritania
Africa Mauritius
Africa Mozambique
Africa Nigeria
Africa South Africa
Africa Tanzania
Africa Uganda
Africa Zambia
Africa Zimbabwe
Asia Bangladesh
Asia China
Asia Hong Kong
Asia India
Asia Indonesia
Asia Japan
Asia Korea (South)
Asia Malaysia
Asia Nepal
Asia Pakistan
Asia Philippines
Asia Singapore
Asia Sri Lanka
Asia Taiwan
Asia Thailand
Asia Vietnam
Central and Eastern Europe Albania
Central and Eastern Europe Armenia
Central and Eastern Europe Azerbaijan
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Region Country
Central and Eastern Europe Bosnia-Herzegovina
Central and Eastern Europe Bulgaria
Central and Eastern Europe Croatia
Central and Eastern Europe Czech Republic
Central and Eastern Europe Estonia
Central and Eastern Europe Hungary
Central and Eastern Europe Kazakhstan
Central and Eastern Europe Latvia
Central and Eastern Europe Lithuania
Central and Eastern Europe Macedonia
Central and Eastern Europe Moldova
Central and Eastern Europe Montenegro
Central and Eastern Europe Poland
Central and Eastern Europe Romania
Central and Eastern Europe Serbia
Central and Eastern Europe Slovakia
Central and Eastern Europe Slovenia
Latin America Argentina
Latin America Bolivia
Latin America Brazil
Latin America Colombia
Latin America Costa Rica
Latin America Dominican Republic
Latin America Ecuador
Latin America El Salvador
Latin America Guatemala
Latin America Guyana
Latin America Honduras
Latin America Jamaica
Latin America Nicaragua
Latin America Panama
Latin America Paraguay
Latin America Peru
Latin America Trinidad and Tobago
Latin America Uruguay
Latin America Venezuela
Latin America Chile
Middle East/North Africa Algeria
Middle East/North Africa Bahrain
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Region Country
Middle East/North Africa Cyprus
Middle East/North Africa Egypt
Middle East/North Africa Israel
Middle East/North Africa Jordan
Middle East/North Africa Kuwait
Middle East/North Africa Madagascar
Middle East/North Africa Morocco
Middle East/North Africa Qatar
Middle East/North Africa Tunisia
Middle East/North Africa Turkey
Middle East/North Africa United Arab Emirates
North America Canada
North America Mexico
North America United States
Oceania Australia
Oceania New Zealand
Russia Russia
Russia Ukraine
Western Europe Austria
Western Europe Belgium
Western Europe Denmark
Western Europe Finland
Western Europe France
Western Europe Germany
Western Europe Greece
Western Europe Iceland
Western Europe Ireland
Western Europe Italy
Western Europe Luxembourg
Western Europe Malta
Western Europe Netherlands
Western Europe Norway
Western Europe Portugal
Western Europe Spain
Western Europe Sweden
Western Europe Switzerland
Western Europe United Kingdom
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